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THE TRAGEDY OF THE CARROTS: 
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN THE CHOICE 
OF PRICE INSTRUMENTS 
Brian Galle* 
Externalities are one of the most fundamental market failure justifications 
for government action, and Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are standard tools for 
correcting them. Even so, neither the legal nor the economic literature offers any 
comprehensive account of when policymakers should prefer taxes to subsidies or 
vice versa. This Article takes up that task. Prior efforts to distinguish between 
“carrots” and “sticks” have generally been limited to the context of pollution 
regulation, and I show here that even those efforts are incomplete. I also extend 
the analysis to the case of positive externalities, where there is little prior litera-
ture to speak of. Overall, I find that sticks are usually superior to carrots, but that 
there are some interesting exceptions. 
Nonetheless, carrots are rampant in modern lawmaking, especially carrots 
in the form of tax expenditures. I identify features of modern politics and law that 
contribute to the current inefficient overproduction of carrots. Among others, I 
find that federalism contributes to political preferences for carrots. That implies 
an until-now unrecognized reason to centralize certain forms of government reg-
ulation. 
Finally, I take issue with the claims of the environmental literature that car-
rots, even if the inferior policy choice, should be used when politics would be 
likely otherwise to frustrate any regulation. Using carrots in critical and closely 
contested situations only contributes to externality producers’ incentives to raise 
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INTRODUCTION 
Humans sometimes need a bit of encouragement to do good for other peo-
ple. In a well-known passage of the Old Testament, Jehovah castigates the Isra-
elites for failing to pay a tithe to support His temple, and notes that He has 
cursed their nation for their collective failures.1 Then, lightening up a bit, He 
also promises three blessings for those who tithe.2 Modern secular leaders offer 
more worldly rewards, in the form of a federal income tax deduction, for those 
who support churches and other goods shared jointly with others.3 In this Arti-
cle, taking a lead from Malachi, I ask: What about the curse? Why not incentiv-
ize charitable giving with a penalty provision, instead of giving away public 
money? More generally, when should incentives take the form of punishments, 
rather than rewards? 
A more familiar path to the same questions would be to suppose that we 
were all to agree that the U.S. government should take steps to slow global cli-
mate change. How should we do it? We might cap directly the amount of 
greenhouse gases emitted—for example, by issuing a limited number of per-
 
 1. Malachi 3:8-9. 
 2. Malachi 3:10-12. 
 3. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006). 
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mits to emit those gases and letting firms exchange them.4 Or we might change 
the price of greenhouse gas components, such as through a “carbon tax.”5 And, 
though it may not be obvious at first glance, a very similar approach to the car-
bon tax would simply be to pay polluters to stop, much as the United States did 
during the brief life of its “cash for clunkers” program, and as it continues to do 
now through a variety of renewable energy tax credits, home rehabilitation tax 
credits, and so on.6 
What policymakers have failed to consider closely is: Which of the price 
approaches is better? Taking money from polluters, or giving to those who 
clean things up? The stick, or the carrot? Surprisingly, the environmental litera-
ture has given only glancing attention to that question, and outside the carbon-
tax debate it seems hardly to have been considered in a systematic way at all.7 
This Article fills that gap. 
 
 4. This proposal passed the U.S. House of Representatives. American Clean Energy 
and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 5. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009). 
 6. For an overview of the many provisions, see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
111TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES FOR ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSERVATION 21-107 
(Comm. Print 2009), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/042309jctdoc1 
.pdf. 
 7. There is an environmental economics literature on the use of subsidies, sometimes 
known as “PES,” or “payment for environmental services.” See THOMAS STERNER, POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 167-80 (2003); 
Stefanie Engel et al., Designing Payments for Environmental Services in Theory and Prac-
tice: An Overview of the Issues, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 663, 663-74 (2008); see also Howard 
F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83 
GEO. L.J. 2131, 2149-64 (1995) (comparing subsidies and penalties as tools for encouraging 
international climate agreements); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regula-
tion: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 701-96 (1999) (examining 
subsidies together with other policy options for containing global warming). For the most 
part that literature is descriptive, see Engel et al., supra, at 664, although Chang, Sterner, and 
Weiner ask explicitly whether subsidies are ever normatively preferable to penalties. 
Other writers have also investigated the relative cost-effectiveness of taxes and subsi-
dies. An early economics literature examined the so-called “output” effect, which is one of 
the several factors I examine here. E.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE 
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 211-34 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1988) (1975); 
Robert E. Kohn, When Subsidies for Pollution Abatement Increase Total Emissions, 59 S. 
ECON. J. 77 (1992); Stuart Mestelman, Production Externalities and Corrective Subsidies: A 
General Equilibrium Analysis, 9 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 186 (1982); A. Mitchell 
Polinsky, Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control, 12 CAN. J. 
ECON. 75 (1979). Others consider the transaction costs of the two systems. See, e.g., Donald 
Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 62-65 (1984); 
Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots Versus Sticks 8-31 (Wash. Univ. in St. 
Louis Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-09-03, Aug. 2009) 
[hereinafter De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots Versus Sticks], available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1470129. The most recent evolution of that project is Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & 
Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365 
(2009) [hereinafter Dari-Mattiacci & De Geest, Multiplication Effect], which argues that the 
relative price-efficacy of sticks is a reason to prefer them to carrots, and that theirs is the first 
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As many readers know, there is a vigorous debate in the environmental lit-
erature on the first set of choices I just mentioned: whether pollutants can best 
be controlled by regulating their quantity, or instead by affecting their price.8 
Within the subset of price options, the choice of carbon-tax design might call to 
mind prominent recent debates over the use of so-called “tax expenditures,” 
which consist mostly of arguments over whether the tax system should be used 
to implement spending programs.9 
These questions are interesting and important, but so far they have mostly 
obscured the fact that there is a third key set of decisions to be made about reg-
ulatory goals that, like global climate change policy, attempt to grapple with the 
costs one group of society imposes on another. Such costs (as, again, most 
readers likely know) are commonly called “externalities,” and at least since 
A.C. Pigou economists have known that when a consumer does not pay the full 
cost of consuming a unit of a good, she is likely to purchase more than society 
optimally would want.10 One mechanism for correcting that inefficiency is to 
change the price the consumer pays for that next unit of a good—its “marginal” 
price—to reflect the total cost society bears from its consumption.11 As it turns 
out, there are two ways of accomplishing that task: tax the good, or pay the 
consumer not to consume it.12 In other words, we can make the externality pro-
ducer worse off than under the status quo: a stick. Or we can make the producer 
better off: a carrot. 
Choices between carrots and sticks are hardly unique to environmental 
regulation. Indeed, they pop up anywhere we might use a price mechanism for 
overcoming externalities. Since externalities are one of a handful of fundamen-
tal justifications for government regulation, the carrot/stick problem, I will ar-
 
sustained attempt to distinguish normatively between the two instruments. Id. at 367-68. I 
agree on both fronts, but there are a number of other relevant factors in the debate, some of 
which may point in the opposite direction. 
 8. Compare Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address 
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 348-53 (2008) (quantity), with William D. 
Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming, 1 
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 26 (2007) (price), Marc J. Roberts & Michael Spence, Effluent 
Charges and Licenses Under Uncertainty, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 193 (1976) (price), and Martin L. 
Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974) (price).  
 9. Compare Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 
57 TAX L. REV. 187, 192-99, 206-21 (2004) (suggesting some merits to use of the tax system 
for policy implementation), and Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at 
Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1165, 1175-84 (1993) (same), with J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert D. Peroni, Can Tax 
Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New 
Paradigm” and Its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135, 172-79 (2010) (criticizing use of tax 
system for non-tax policy goals), and Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Con-
gress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Process, 36 OHIO N. 
UNIV. L. REV. 1, 4-30 (2010) (same). 
 10. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1932). 
 11. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 134 (2d ed. 2007). 
 12. Id. at 134-35. 
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gue, is pervasive throughout government action.13 Another prominent recent 
example is health insurance. Individuals who seek medical care when they lack 
insurance (or other means to pay) create fiscal externalities for other users of 
the health system: either paying customers pay more, or health providers take 
home less, to cover the expense of those who can’t afford care.14 The Afforda-
ble Care Act implements both a carrot and a stick to deal with this externality, 
and it applies those two tools selectively to two different populations. The 
poorest households get a carrot: they receive a subsidy to buy their own health 
insurance.15 Everyone else gets a stick: they must buy health insurance, or pay 
a penalty tax.16 
By one measure, penalties and subsidies, or what I’ve been calling sticks 
and carrots, are largely indistinguishable. One way to put this point is that there 
is no marginal difference between taxing you a dollar if you do something and 
paying you a dollar if you don’t. Smoke that cigarette? One dollar, please. 
Throw it away? Here’s a buck. Either way, the marginal cost of choosing to 
smoke your next butt, rather than discarding it, is one dollar. This equivalence 
turns on the concept of opportunity costs, which I explain in more detail in    
Part I.B. 
But carrots can also differ importantly from sticks in their other economic 
and even moral effects.17 Relative to present policy, a carrot transfers wealth 
from taxpayers to its recipients, while sticks have the opposite effect. This 
transfer can change the preferences of the regulated party, fill or drain govern-
ment coffers, suit or offend our preferences for punishment and just distribu-
tions, and change the incentives of parties who are planning for the next change 
in regulation. Many of the individual components of this analysis are familiar 
from other literatures, such as debates over the law of takings or the best way to 
compensate parties affected by changes in legal rules. 
What is novel about my argument here is that it synthesizes these other lit-
eratures to reach a global assessment of the relative merits of carrots and sticks 
as policy tools.18 Prior analyses, to the extent they’ve considered the question 
 
 13. Id. at 122. 
 14. Id. at 422. 
 15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 §§ 1401(a), 
1402(a)-(c), 1421(a), 2001(a), 124 Stat. 119, 213, 220, 237, 271 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 16. 26 U.S.C. § 5000(a) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 17. For more detail on the points in this paragraph, see Part III below. 
 18. To be sure, there are literally dozens of other sources that discuss “carrots and 
sticks.” But in nearly all cases these other works merely discuss the role of incentives in hu-
man behavior, rather than attempting to distinguish between the two mechanisms. Ian 
Ayres’s recent book, intended for popular audiences, does suggest differences between car-
rots and sticks as policy tools, but heavily emphasizes the difference in framing between the 
two and does not discuss the considerations addressed here. IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND 
STICKS: UNLOCKING THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET THINGS DONE 45-72 (2010). Another 
cousin is Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities, 17 INT’L REV. 
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at all, have tended to dismiss carrots out of hand because of their supposed pro-
pensity to encourage some actors to do bad in order to be paid to stop.19 As I 
argue here, there is actually considerably more nuance to the problem, with a 
number of factors that favor carrots in some circumstances. Still, at least when 
it comes to discouraging negative behavior, I agree we should often prefer 
sticks. Sticks reduce the wealth of those who make the rest of us miserable, 
which makes sense both in terms of the effect of income on preferences and al-
so in terms of our sense of justice. Sticks also replace other costly forms of rev-
enue, where carrots instead put extra burdens on the treasury. 
Another contribution I make is to extend my analysis to the production of 
positive externalities.20 Nearly all the existing discussion related to the choice 
of price instruments focuses on the classic case of pollution and close ana-
logues.21 But there is no reason the same analysis cannot be extended to the 
production of social goods, such as charity or innovation. Why do we reward 
donors instead of punishing the tightfisted? As I show, there is a surprisingly 
good case for using sticks to produce positive externalities, although it is not as 
clear-cut as with negative externalities. 
I also add to the existing lore by analyzing the political tragedies that lead 
us to choose carrots over sticks.22 Once we recognize the basic economic struc-
ture of sticks as transfers from a concentrated interest group to society at large, 
it becomes fairly obvious that politics will tend to favor carrots. Less obviously, 
many aspects of judge-made law, such as the doctrines of standing, unconstitu-
tional conditions, and the dormant Commerce Clause, also contribute inadvert-
ently to our hunger for carrots. Prior commentators have treated these political 
preferences for carrots as a reason to use carrots, especially in high-stakes leg-
 
L. & ECON. 309 (1997), which considers the strategic incentives of nations bargaining over 
international environmental law. Both Chang and Ayres have insights to contribute to my 
project, but their main focus is elsewhere. 
 19. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 7, at 2150-64; Wiener, supra note 7, at 726-27, 755-
56. 
 20. As far as I am aware, Wittman’s brief discussion is the only prior example of any 
analysis of the carrot/stick decision for positive externalities, and he limits his discussion to 
transaction costs. See Wittman, supra note 7, at 71, 79. 
 21. E.g., BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 7, at 213; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115-24 (1972); Wiener, supra note 7. A possible exception is Cass R. 
Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 543-48 (2000), which, 
although framed as a choice among different kinds of property rules, does briefly discuss a 
few factors influencing the choice among price mechanisms and other options for encourag-
ing the production of public interest programming. Some authors have considered why the 
tort system punishes wrongdoing but does not require restitution for gratuitous good deeds, 
see, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 26-30 (2009) 
(discussing prior literature), but these studies do not consider whether the best incentives for 
good deeds would instead be sticks for failure to provide the good. 
 22. For discussion of the points in this paragraph, see Part V below. Prior literature 
does include some discussion of the political economy of the choice between carrots and 
sticks, most notably STERNER, supra note 7, at 180-202. 
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islation. I argue instead that acceding to demands for carrots is like capitulating 
to blackmail: it only leads to greater incentives for bad behavior in the future. 
My analysis of the politics of carrots also raises a point of particular inter-
est for those who study federalism. At this point there is a standard list of poli-
cy arguments either for assigning government responsibilities to the national 
government or devolving them to states and localities.23 Federalism commenta-
tors have mostly devoted their efforts to rebalancing among these well-known 
points.24 I offer here a new reason for preferring central government to local: 
local governments face excessive pressure to use carrots, and carrots are often 
inefficient. Thus, while the existing federalism literature recognizes that the 
presence of externalities that spill across borders might be a justification for 
federal action, my analysis implies that even externalities that do not cross bor-
ders might better be handled by the central government. 
In short, our practice to date of neglecting the importance of the choice be-
tween carrots and sticks has led to some unfortunate policy decisions. Thinking 
about that carrot/stick choice systematically can teach us some useful lessons 
for institutional design. Thus, I also use the synthesis I develop to cast a new 
light on a wide variety of existing government programs. Some, such as the 
new Affordable Care Act, turn out reasonably well. But many others, some 
costing tens of billions of dollars per year, don’t. 
In Part I, I will define more explicitly what I see as the difference between 
carrots and sticks, and offer up some background in the basic economics that 
motivates their use. Part II details the ways that carrots and sticks differ eco-
nomically and ethically, in particular in their impact on revenue, income and 
output effects, distribution, and incentives. Part III applies that framework to 
the regulation of negative externalities, and offers a number of examples. Part 
IV does the same for positive externalities. Part V explains why the political 
system inefficiently overproduces carrots, identifies the legal rules that further 
push politics in that direction, and argues that carrots should probably be re-
jected even in the case of important legislation that could not otherwise pass. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Carrots and Sticks Defined 
Before beginning our discussion of carrots and sticks, it will be useful to 
explain what I mean when I use those terms. I define a carrot here as a wel-
 
 23. For definitive reviews, see Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1120 (1999); Wallace E. Oates, Toward a Second-Generation Theory of 
Fiscal Federalism, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349 (2005). 
 24. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation 
in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1335-37 (2009) (describing the back-
and-forth claims). 
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come change against a given, usually pre-existing, policy baseline; a stick is 
simply an unwelcome change in the opposite direction. As I’ll explain in a 
moment, the phrase “against a given policy baseline” is important, since for my 
purposes it is all that separates the two. 
Carrots and sticks can take many forms. Being relieved from an obligation 
one expects to have can be a carrot. For instance, suppose I expect to have to 
pay $10,000 in income taxes at the end of the year. To avoid some awkward 
moments, such as audits and jail time, I set aside that amount in anticipation of 
the bill.25 Congress changes the law so that my tax bill will be only $9,000 if I 
buy a hybrid car.26 Now, as soon as I roll off the dealer’s lot with my new 
Prius, I have an extra grand to spend that I didn’t expect.27 So these kind of 
“tax expenditures,” as they are sometimes known, count as carrots, even though 
in a sense they are just relief from some other burden.28 A stick can be the op-
posite. When the federal government threatens to withhold highway dollars 
from states if they don’t increase their drinking age to twenty-one, as it did to 
prompt the famous Supreme Court case South Dakota v. Dole,29 that is a stick: 
a denial of some portion of an expected benefit.30 
There is something a little bit strange about calling the condition on high-
way dollars a stick, though. After all, even if the state gets less than expected, it 
still gets some federal money. And who is to say that the state was entitled to 
any money at all? If we were to measure whether a rule is a carrot or stick from 
some baseline of what the “right” outcome is, or the economically efficient one, 
then it isn’t clear at all what to call the drinking-age rule. The answer depends 
on how much money we think South Dakota “should” get, in some normative 
sense, and then whether the rule departs upwards or downwards from there. 
Perhaps it is possible to make these distinctions, but that is not my goal 
here. As others have pointed out in a variety of legal contexts, establishing the 
normatively correct baseline for deciding when departures up or down from 
 
 25. Typically, in the United States, our employers are obliged to do this for us, a pro-
cedure known as income tax withholding. IRS, PUBLICATION 15, (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S 
TAX GUIDE (2011).  
 26. Actually, when the author purchased his Prius, the tax credit was $3150. See Sum-
mary of the Credit for Qualified Hybrid Vehicles, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/ 
0,,id=157557,00.html (last updated Nov. 8, 2007); see also 26 U.S.C. § 30B (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2010) (establishing the credit). 
 27. Assuming, of course, that the dealer doesn’t increase its price by $1000 in antici-
pation of my windfall. Sometimes the economic benefits of a carrot go to a party other than 
the one the law assigns them to. But that doesn’t reduce the efficacy of the carrot, as I’ll ex-
plain shortly.  
 28. Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current 
Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225, 228 (1979). 
 29. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 30. On the withholding of an expected carrot as equivalent to a stick, see Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1712 (2008). 
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that base should be called “subsidies” is challenging.31 What I offer instead is 
simply a framework for evaluating departures from any given baseline. From 
wherever we start, should we move up (carrots) or down (sticks)? 
If it isn’t obvious from what I have just said, let me emphasize that defin-
ing any particular policy as either carrot or stick is mostly arbitrary. Given a 
different baseline, any carrot can morph into a stick and vice-versa. To see this, 
consider the recent health care legislation, which imposes a tax on individuals 
who do not purchase qualifying health insurance.32 That tax, with some excep-
tions, is two percent of annual income.33 Is this a carrot or a stick? Seen from 
before the legislation was put into place, it looks like a stick: do this thing or 
pay this new, higher amount. But once the legislation is in place, it looks like a 
carrot: if taxpayers buy insurance, they get a discount on their income taxes, 
which happen to be two percent higher than they were at a time in the recent 
past.34 
From a normative perspective, this fluidity of definitions turns out not to be 
a problem for my analysis, because almost everything that I will argue is per-
fectly symmetrical. As we’ll see, granting carrots enriches recipients at the cost 
of the general public, and that has implications for the strategic behavior of par-
ties who might be awarded carrots. Using sticks enriches the public at the cost 
of those menaced with the stick, and has the opposite strategic incentives. My 
framework can therefore be used to compare any two levels (including zero) of 
price instruments to each other, since the relative effect of moving from one to 
the other is the same regardless of direction. For instance, comparing a big stick 
to a small stick is the same as thinking about moving from neutrality to a carrot 
(if a small stick is the baseline) or from neutrality to a stick (if a big stick is the 
baseline). Either way, we will find that, as compared to the small stick, the big 
stick enriches the general public at the expense of the regulated party, and that 
this difference will spur similar incentive effects whichever baseline we start 
with. Given the difficulty of establishing normatively correct baselines, I view 
this indifference to baseline as a feature, not a weakness, of the carrot/stick 
framework. 
As I’ll try to show, though, the political and psychological dimensions of a 
policy change are not perfectly symmetrical. The current state of the world has 
an important impact on how people and governments respond to proposed 
changes. These responses are, to say the least, not always in accordance with 
the normative prescriptions of the rest of the framework. 
 
 31. E.g., Robert Carroll et al., Income Versus Consumption Tax Baselines for Tax Ex-
penditures, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 491, 492-93 (2011); Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond 
the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 603, 610-22 (2003); Peter Westen, The Empty 
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982). 
 32. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 33. Id. § 5000A(c). 
 34. Edward D. Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, 128 TAX NOTES 755 (2010) (point-
ing out that these two structures are economically identical). 
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Along those lines, another issue readers should keep in the back of their 
minds is that the literature on price instruments assumes that individuals in fact 
respond to changes in their self-interest. To the extent that some instruments 
may be more difficult for individuals to notice or understand, they may not ful-
ly produce the predicted effects. In other cases, actors may fail to respond fully 
to incentives because of agency problems: those who decide on behalf of the 
actor could have self-interested goals that don’t fully align with their princi-
pal’s. For purposes of this Article, though, I will assume away these problems, 
in the hope that simplification will allow me to better focus on the basic lessons 
of fully operational price theory.  
B. Economics of a Pigouvian Tax 
In this next introductory Subpart, I will explain how carrots and sticks are 
usually used as policy tools. I provide, in other words, a brief overview of the 
theory of price mechanisms, and explain why that theory treats carrots and 
sticks as equivalent in most ways. Readers familiar with basic microeconomic 
theory can safely skip to Part II. 
Most policy analysts to date have not focused closely on the differences be-
tween carrots and sticks because in at least one important aspect the two are 
identical. Either a penalty or a subsidy can be equally effective as a price 
mechanism for setting the “right” marginal price of a good.35 To see this, it’s 
helpful to first step back and ask what it means for society to have the “wrong” 
amount of a good (and when I say “good” here, I mean anything humans might 
want, ranging from hunks of cheese to leisure time). 
Externalities are a common reason why private markets fail to produce the 
amount of a good that best satisfies society.36 An externality is just some other 
person’s reaction to the things that I do.37 For instance, if I grow oranges in my 
backyard, some rotten oranges might fall into my neighbor’s driveway, produc-
ing sticky juice stains on his new car.38 If I am totally self-interested, I have no 
reason to care about my neighbor’s car. As the economist Ronald Coase point-
ed out, though, my neighbor may find ways to persuade me to clean up the sit-
uation: either by paying me to prune my trees, or perhaps by threatening to 
prune something else if I don’t.39 
 
 35. A “marginal” price is just the cost for the purchase of one incremental unit of some 
good.  
 36. GRUBER, supra note 11, at 122. 
 37. For more nuance, see BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 7, at 15-18. 
 38. The author denies that this ever happened while he lived in Florida, Bob.  
 39. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), re-
printed in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95 (1988). And really, Bob, 
that was uncalled for. 
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Externalities can be either negative or positive.40 Maybe my neighbor also 
enjoys the shade of my tree, or even collects a few tasty oranges that make a 
softer landing on his property: these could be positive externalities. In either 
case, because the producer of the externality does not have any direct reason to 
care about the effects of the externality on others, she produces either too much 
or too little of the good. If there are negative externalities, she produces too 
much; if there are positive, too little. In conventional economic terms, the total 
production of the good deviates from the “optimal” social amount, because the 
net social cost or benefit of each unit of the good differs from the producer’s 
private cost or benefit.41 
One typical economist’s solution to these failures of the private market to 
get things right is to adjust the producer’s price to match society’s prefer-
ences.42 For example, suppose that each orange tree I grow causes an expected 
$1000 of damage to my neighbor’s property. If my neighbor has no legal re-
course against me, I will grow more trees than the optimal amount, since when 
I decide whether to plant another tree I consider only my own costs and bene-
fits and not his. But if there were, say, a $1000 orange tree tax, or if my neigh-
bor could file a $1000 lawsuit against me for creating a sticky orange nuisance, 
then I will produce only as many trees as would be cost-justified given both my 
own preferences and also his. Alternately, if he enjoys my shade and tasty fruit, 
society might give me a $1000 subsidy to grow trees, so that I will be willing to 
plant even if my own benefits from tree growing are small. These price mecha-
nisms are often called “Pigouvian” (or, sometimes, “Pigovian”) taxes, after the 
economist A.C. Pigou, who first suggested them.43 They are usually thought to 
be superior to more direct forms of government control in that they reveal pri-
vate market information about the efficient amount of regulation, and allow the 
market to allocate externality reduction to the least-cost reducers.44 All of this 
assumes, I should note, that the Coasean solution of direct bargaining would 
not work. That may be untrue of me and my neighbor,45 but seems more plau-
sible for goods with widespread impact, such as pollution or education.46 
 
 40. GRUBER, supra note 11, at 135. 
 41. Id. at 134. 
 42. Another tool, which I omit here for simplicity, is a so-called “quantity” regulation. 
In that case, society would simply determine how many trees I should grow, and force or 
incentivize me to grow that many. The mechanisms can be similar in many respects, but do 
differ in some important ways, as others have ably explained. See, e.g., STERNER, supra note 
7, at 136-47; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to 
Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2-15 (2002); Wiener, supra note 7, at 727-
34.  
 43. GRUBER, supra note 11, at 134. 
 44. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 42, at 4; Wiener, supra note 7, 714-15 (describing 
this point as the general consensus of economists). 
 45. Unjustified pruning threats notwithstanding. Actually, even bargaining between 
two parties can fail for a variety of reasons, including strategic behavior and the possibility 
that the parties assign different utility to an identical amount of dollars. Herbert Hovenkamp, 
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Society can use either carrots or sticks interchangeably to get externality 
producers to “internalize” the marginal effects of their decisions on others.47 
Again, one way to force me to recognize the $1000 per tree impact of my rotten 
oranges is to tax me $1000 per tree. But another way would be to offer to pay 
me $1000 not to plant the new sapling I’ve purchased. These are equivalent on 
the margin—that is, from the perspective of my single decision to plant the sap-
ling or not—because of opportunity costs.48 An opportunity cost is just the val-
ue of what I give up when I make a particular decision.49 If I am self-employed 
and I take the day off to watch Oprah reruns, my opportunity cost is the reve-
nue I could have earned working. So, too, with the sapling. If you offer me 
$1000 to throw away the sapling, then my opportunity cost of planting instead 
is $1000. 
To see this more clearly, consider my economic position under the tax and 
the subsidy. If there is a tax, and I choose to plant the tree, I have a new tree 
and I am poorer by $1000. If I don’t plant, I have no tree and $1000 in my 
pocket. Now the subsidy. If I don’t plant, I have no tree, and I have an extra 
$1000 in my pocket from your subsidy. If I do plant, I have a nice new tree, but 
my pockets are empty. Either way, the decision to plant the tree costs me 
$1000: an economist would say the marginal cost of planting is $1000. 
If this equivalence seems unnatural to you, reader, you are not alone.50 Re-
searchers have found time and again that we perceive gains differently from 
losses.51 We take the status quo (or, sometimes, other salient events, such as 
the price we paid at purchase) as a fixed point of reference, and we evaluate 
departures from it in different directions differently.52 In particular, we tend to 
 
Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 789-806 (1990); Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724, 734 (1996).  
 46. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1107-10; Kaplow & Shavell, supra 
note 45, at 749. 
 47. This insight is usually credited to ALLEN V. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL 
WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 90-93 (1964). 
Interchangeability also requires that the tax system treat sticks and carrots identically, 
which it does not always do. See Gregg D. Polsky & Dan Markel, Taxing Punitive Damages, 
96 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1302-27 (2010) (explaining how the federal tax system may distort 
intended incentive effects of state tort law); Ethan Yale, Taxing Cap-and-Trade Environmen-
tal Regulation, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 548 (2008) (examining interactions between corpo-
rate income tax and environmental controls). 
 48. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (8th ed. 2011). 
 49. Id. at 7-12. 
 50. See Dari-Mattiacci & De Geest, Multiplication Effect, supra note 7, at 367 (point-
ing out that framing effects may undermine traditional equivalence between taxes and     
subsidies). 
 51. JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 269-70 (4th ed. 2007) (summarizing 
studies). 
 52. Id. at 267-68. 
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be “loss averse”: we fear losses more than we prize gains.53 But often the dif-
ference between a gain and a loss is just a matter of how it’s framed: is the loss 
of the $1000 subsidy a “loss,” or not? These kinds of “framing effects” impact 
how actors respond to incentives, even when those incentives are economically 
equivalent.54 But framing effects are a matter of the happenstance of how a 
given policy is described, and so can potentially be changed to suit our policy 
objectives. 
II. CARROTS AND STICKS AS PRICE INSTRUMENTS 
What then are the real, rather than perceived, differences between carrots 
and sticks? If we put together a mosaic with pieces of the arguments scattered 
through the instrument-choice literature, our mosaic would have four basic 
kinds of tiles. I will call them income effects, revenues, distributional conse-
quences, and incentives. A possible fifth tile, closely related to income effects, 
is what I will call output effects; output effects are like income effects, but for 
firms rather than people. 
Income effects are changes in individual behavior resulting purely from 
changes in that person’s budget.55 Most of what we buy are items an economist 
would call “normal” goods: the more money we have, the more we want of the 
things we want.56 Typically our budget isn’t large enough to permit us to con-
sume all we might desire. As our budget constraint loosens, we consume more. 
In some cases, our deeper pockets allow us to shift away from the bargain 
goods we were buying and now consume a more desirable alternative; an econ-
omist would call the goods we abandon in this process “inferior” goods.57 Ei-
ther way, modest changes in the price of one good among many probably won’t 
have large effects on the wealth-driven preferences of an average household, 
but could have more significant impacts on the preferences of very poor      
families.58 
The change in preferences resulting from income effects can sometimes ei-
ther reinforce or undermine the change in demand resulting from a carrot or 
stick.59 While both price mechanisms change the marginal cost of an additional 
unit of a good, they have opposite effects on the individual’s wealth. Carrots, 
obviously, make the recipient richer than she was under the prior policy, while 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 267 & n.8.  
 55. GRUBER, supra note 11, at 36. 
 56. Id. at 36 n.1. But see THE NOTORIOUS B.I.G., Mo Money Mo Problems, on LIFE 
AFTER DEATH (Bad Boy Records 1997). 
 57. GRUBER, supra note 11, at 36 n.1. 
 58. See POSNER, supra note 48, at 7 & n.8 (noting that no one has successfully identi-
fied an inferior good for which the income effect would exceed the substitution effect). 
 59. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1095-96 (observing that assigning a 
legal entitlement enriches the entitled party and so may change its preferences). 
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sticks if triggered impoverish the payer. The resulting income effect may or 
may not be in the same direction as the substitution effect of the price change. 
For example, cigarette taxes both make cigarettes more expensive and also ef-
fectively shrink the budgets of those who buy them anyway. If cigarettes are 
“normal” goods, these are complementary effects, since both will tend to dis-
courage cigarette purchases. 
Income effects can dominate other incentives when demand for a good is 
highly inelastic.60 In that case, the “substitution” effect of the Pigouvian tax is 
small. Price hikes, for example, may not do much to deter nicotine addicts from 
smoking.61 Rather, it would be the smoker’s budget that determines how many 
packs he can buy. Income effects can also be magnified by impulsiveness; large 
changes in transitory wealth may have disproportionately large effects on 
household consumption behavior.62 
Business firms and other organizations do not have preferences as such, but 
changes in price can have a similar impact on their output by changing the sup-
ply of, rather than the demand for, a good.63 Of course, the equilibrium supply 
of a good depends on both supply and demand curves. The supply curve of a 
firm in turn depends on the costs of its inputs, such as labor and raw materials. 
If a government policy changes the cost of these inputs, the firm’s supply curve 
shifts, likely altering the equilibrium point where supply and demand inter-
sect.64 The change in price can come anywhere in the chain of supply, includ-
ing at the end: cigarette taxes are collected by retailers, but the resulting in-
crease in price still depresses equilibrium supply.65 
 
 60. “Inelastic” means simply that demand doesn’t change much when price changes. 
GRUBER, supra note 11, at 45-46. 
 61. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case 
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1218-20 n.254 (1998) (analyz-
ing studies of price elasticity of tobacco products). 
 62. Cf. Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted 
Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 33, 68-71 (2010) 
(surveying studies of the relationship between timing of income and household consump-
tion). Another way to put this point is that, if saving and borrowing are costless, a household 
will base purchasing decisions on expected lifetime income. Borrowing, however, may be 
limited by transaction costs and psychological barriers, see id., so that perceived income 
shrinks to the amount available to satisfy budget demands within a relatively short period. 
 63. STERNER, supra note 7, at 167-70. 
 64. I assume here a competitive market. In an oligopolistic market, producers with 
market power can constrain supply to a level below the unrestricted equilibrium, allowing 
them to capture more of the subsidy in profit rather than passing along the cost savings to 
consumers. In the long run, though, even that scenario often will result in greater output, 
since eventually entrepreneurs will recognize the superior profits to be had in the industry 
and, assuming the oligopolists cannot easily keep them out, they will compete away the 
higher profits. For a detailed discussion of the effect of subsidies in oligopolistic markets, 
see Klaus Conrad & Jianmin Wang, The Effect of Emission Taxes and Abatement Subsidies 
on Market Structure, 11 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 499, 500-18 (1993). 
 65. In some situations, such as when components of the taxed good can be divided up 
and thereby escape a portion of the tax, taxes may actually decrease the price of the original 
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Output effects, like income effects, can undermine or reinforce the intend-
ed substitution effect of a carrot or stick. Suppose that the good producing ex-
ternalities is not the end product, but instead one of its inputs. Then the total 
amount of that input in the economy is the mathematical product of the amount 
used in each widget times the number of widgets sold.66 Government policies 
might increase one while reducing the other. As Baumol and Oates have 
shown, subsidies for clean energy can actually result in more pollution, since 
the extra cash flowing to a subsidized industry may attract so much new in-
vestment that it creates a net increase in output.67 If that increase in output 
outweighs the greening of the industry’s production process, pollution increases 
overall. The reverse is true of sticks: by reducing output, a stick would com-
plement the pollution-reducing incentives of changing the marginal price for 
the firm’s polluting inputs. 
A second key difference between carrots and sticks is revenues.68 If the 
government is dispensing carrots and wielding sticks, those policies affect the 
treasury. Carrots require new expenditures relative to the existing baseline, 
while sticks can bring in revenue. This matters because public revenues are 
themselves costly to raise. Obviously the tax system is costly to administer.69 
In addition, taxes change people’s behavior, as anyone who has seen the narrow 
houses of Amsterdam or the thrilling opening of Beverly Hills Cop can attest.70 
In most instances, these changes in behavior simply reduce the taxpayer’s wel-
fare without producing much new revenue for the government—an outcome 
economists refer to as “deadweight loss.”71 But in the case of a tax stick, the 
change in behavior is itself a desirable outcome. Carrots and sticks may also 
vary in their administrative costs, which might either contribute to or mitigate 
the revenue differential between the two.72 
 
(now unbundled) good. See Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and 
Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647, 649-50 (2000). 
 66. See STERNER, supra note 7, at 167-68. 
 67. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 7, at 217-30. 
 68. See Wiener, supra note 7, at 727. 
 69. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Janet Holtzblatt, The Role of Administrative Issues in 
Tax Reform: Simplicity, Compliance, and Administration, in UNITED STATES TAX REFORM IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 179, 179-80 (George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski eds., 2002); Joel 
Slemrod & Nikki Sorum, The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System, 37 
NAT’L TAX J. 461, 462-74 (1985). 
 70. On Amsterdam’s skinny homes, see HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC 
FINANCE 371 (8th ed. 2008). To watch Axel Foley wreck most of downtown Detroit in his 
pursuit of untaxed cigarettes, see BEVERLY HILLS COP (Paramount Pictures 1984).  
 71. GRUBER, supra note 11, at 578-79. 
 72. The classic analysis of the differing transaction costs between the two is Wittman, 
supra note 7, at 62-65. Wittman asserts that it is more efficient to choose the rule affecting 
fewer actors—for example, punishing theft instead of paying for non-theft, if most people 
comply with the law. Id. at 64-65. It should already be clear that this analysis is seriously 
incomplete. For one, in the case where Wittman would prescribe paying, his analysis fails to 
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Another way that sticks and carrots may vary is in their distributional ef-
fects. This aspect has been fairly well explored in the property law literature.73 
Carrots transfer money from taxpayers to those who produce externalities, 
while sticks obviously do the opposite (except in the unlikely event that the 
stick is so effective that no one pays any penalty). To the extent that the class of 
those who pay does not align perfectly with the class of those who benefit from 
changes in externality-creating behavior, we may be enriching some groups at 
the expense of others. Usually we think these transfers make society better off 
when they flow from rich to poor, and worse off when they flow in the opposite 
direction.74 Furthermore, as property scholars have recognized at least since 
Calabresi and Melamed, our decision of who pays to achieve efficient out-
comes can have significant effects on social perceptions of whether a policy is 
just.75 
Finally, the two instruments induce very different incentives for regulated 
parties over time. As Coase and the long line of those who have discussed his 
theories have recognized, paying an actor to stop creating negative externalities 
may simply encourage others to produce those same externalities, in the hopes 
of being bribed themselves.76 On the other hand, the possibility of a future stick 
might discourage risk- or uncertainty-averse actors from investing in projects 
that could be subject to later penalties.77 Whether that is a desirable result de-
pends on whether society is trying to prevent negative externalities or to induce 
positive ones, as I will play out in the next two Parts. 
Information is another important aspect of the choice between policy in-
struments over time.78 Whether it employs a carrot or a stick, the government 
needs detailed information about the harm or benefit resulting from the exter-
nality. The producers often are in a position to gather information about the ex-
ternality more effectively than the government.79 For example, producers may 
get honest feedback from their customers, rivals, or business partners, while 
those who provide information to the government may be trying self-servingly 
 
account for the deadweight loss involved in raising revenues for payoffs. This loss might 
exceed any administrative savings achieved by reducing the number of affected actors.  
 73. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1121. 
 74. See GRUBER, supra note 11, at 53. 
 75. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1102-03. 
 76. See, e.g., David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking 
Multilateral Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 993, 1026-42 
(1991); Smith, supra note 65, at 698; Wiener, supra note 7, at 726. 
 77. See William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: 
Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 
269, 290-91 & n.48 (1988) (suggesting that failure to compensate for takings may discour-
age investment).  
 78. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 42, at 4, 9. 
 79. See id. at 7. 
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to induce the government to deliver benefits to them.80 Likewise, in some set-
tings, the optimal marginal cost to set using either instrument depends not only 
on the costs or benefits for others but also on the price of avoiding the harm or 
producing the good for the producer.81 Producers usually have better infor-
mation about their own cost structure than the government does.82 
In addition to affecting the decision to produce the externality-creating 
good, carrots and sticks also influence parties’ incentives to develop and reveal 
information. If carrots are on the table, producers should want to develop in-
formation that shows a large marginal social loss from nonoptimal production 
of the good, and perhaps data that demonstrates how costly and difficult it is for 
them to move in the direction the government wants.83 The larger externalities 
are, or the pricier change is for producers, the bigger the subsidy they can cred-
ibly claim to need.84 Once more, the opposite is true for sticks, in that if pro-
ducers reveal that change is vital or very expensive, the government would set a 
very high tax.85 If producers can’t convincingly argue that their costs are low, 
their incentives may be to withhold information altogether, in the hopes that 
uncertainty and low political salience might slow new policies. 
III. CONTROLLING NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES 
Putting these analytic tools together, it becomes clear that sticks usually 
dominate carrots for the control of negative externalities. Sticks are cheaper, 
more effective, accord better with our moral intuitions, and avoid unwanted in-
centives to create new harms. On the other hand, at times the distributive con-
sequences of sticks are overly harsh, and using sticks exclusively can discour-
 
 80. See Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469, 472 (1995) 
(noting that if subsidy amounts vary inversely with donors’ observed willingness to give, 
some donors may give less in order to extract greater subsidies).  
 81. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 42, at 5-6 (claiming this is only the case when 
the government is constrained to use a linear tax schedule); Smith, supra note 65, at 683-96 
(suggesting this is also the case when producers can effectively conceal a portion of the harm 
they produce). In some instances, the added difficulty of measuring producer costs may end 
up being an argument for abandoning Pigouvian pricing altogether and using some other in-
strument, such as a quantity rule. See id. at 685. 
 82. See Paul J. Ferraro, Asymmetric Information and Contract Design for Payments 
for Environmental Services, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 810, 811 (2008); Roldan Muradian et al., 
Reconciling Theory and Practice: An Alternative Conceptual Framework for Understanding 
Payments for Environmental Services, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1202, 1204 (2010). 
 83. Ferraro, supra note 82, at 811. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See STERNER, supra note 7, at 153; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 546-47. Hanson and 
Logue argue that the government can reduce opportunities for producers to conceal infor-
mation by imposing sticks ex post, rather than setting a price ex ante. Hanson & Logue, su-
pra note 61, at 1273-74. While they may be right that measuring is easier than predicting, it 
is unclear why an ex post system would reduce producer incentives to conceal harms as they 
are happening.  
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age mitigation or choke off the supply of privately held information. But these 
possibilities can perhaps be handled with narrow carve-outs from a general rule 
favoring sticks, as I discuss in Part III.B. 
A. General Analysis 
1. Revenues 
The cost advantage of sticks is a familiar point to those who study the car-
bon tax. Because they require new revenues, carrots add to society’s total 
deadweight loss from taxation (or, alternatively, require cuts to other govern-
ment programs), while sticks lessen the deadweight loss.86 That is a central ar-
gument pressed by advocates of the carbon tax, many of whom suggest that its 
revenues create a “double dividend” by both discouraging carbon and also po-
tentially reducing other, more distorting taxes.87 Often, though, proponents 
suggest targeting the revenues derived from the carbon tax for particular pur-
poses, such as an income tax rebate for poorer households.88 To the extent that 
earmarking new revenues in this way constrains the government from spending 
money on the projects that would create the greatest welfare, stick-related reve-
nues may not be as useful as the money they displace.89 
Even if sticks did require revenues, they might still be more cost-effective 
because in many situations a single stick will serve in place of many carrots.90 
 
 86. For empirical evidence of this theory, see Charles L. Ballard & Steven G. 
Medema, The Marginal Efficiency Effects of Taxes and Subsidies in the Presence of Exter-
nalities: A Computational General Equilibrium Approach, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 199 (1993).  
 87. E.g., Wiener, supra note 7, at 730. 
 88. E.g., Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 5, at 513-14 & n.66; Gilbert E. Metcalf, A 
Distributional Analysis of Green Tax Reforms, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 655, 663 (1999). The cli-
mate change bill that passed the U.S. House of Representatives also had this feature. Ameri-
can Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 431 (2009). 
 89. STERNER, supra note 7, at 175. Additionally, most economists would claim that a 
consumption tax cannot be more efficient than an income tax, because both ultimately re-
duce the amount of after-tax goods that workers can consume, and therefore both equally 
distort the decision of how hard to work. Thus, if carbon-tax revenues simply replace income 
tax revenues, there is no net gain in efficiency. My own view is that there is some reason to 
doubt that consumption taxes are as distortive of labor/leisure decisions as income taxes, be-
cause workers may not be as aware of the cumulative burden of consumption taxes. See Bri-
an Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 77-81 (2009) (describing possible welfare 
effects of unnoticed taxation). Because they do not tax savings, consumption taxes also 
might avoid the income tax’s impact on personal savings decisions, which may be efficient 
in some situations. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 745, 783-88 (2007). In any event, switching to a consumption-tax stick can be 
efficient if it replaces taxes other than the individual income tax, such as by reducing the 
corporate income tax. 
 90. One form of stick that might require revenue expenditures is criminal fines. To 
make the stick credible, the government must have enforcement officers, judges, fine-
collectors, and so on. 
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As Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest have recently shown, if a stick is a significant 
enough deterrent, it might need to be used only very rarely, while carrots must 
be paid to every actor who is to be influenced.91 Their key example is a dictator 
threatening a restive populace: the dictator need not shoot everyone, or even 
anyone, as long as all believe the expected cost of being shot exceeds their per-
sonal gains from revolution.92 As those two authors acknowledge, though, this 
mechanism only works if the group that is threatened cannot easily coordinate 
amongst themselves.93 Sticks might not be cost-effective in this way, therefore, 
when used against a small, coherent group.94 
In a separate working paper, De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci also extend their 
analysis to the relative administrative costs of carrots and sticks. As some 
economists have argued, we might expect sticks to be costlier to enforce, be-
cause those subject to sticks will conceal their activities and resist sticks more 
vigorously, necessitating an expensive detection and litigation system.95 On the 
other hand, if society offers carrots, there will be some false positives. For ex-
ample, by one estimate, many claimants of a recent credit for first-time home 
buyers were not, in fact, first-time home buyers; some hadn’t even bought a 
home, and a good number were in prison.96 Since the marginal cost of avoiding 
or claiming the incentive is the same, we should expect risk-neutral actors to 
pursue either strategy with comparable vigor, resulting in similar need for gov-
ernment effort.97  
De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci point out that the volume, if not the individual 
cost, of claims may differ between the two price instruments.98 Most potential 
carrot claimants, and many impostors, will come forward. But many of those 
who might have been subject to a stick will simply curb their behavior. Others 
might invest more energy in concealment, but the government can add addi-
 
 91. Dari-Mattiacci & De Geest, Multiplication Effect, supra note 7, at 369-76; see also 
AYRES, supra note 18, at 50 (calling this a “pretty obvious point”). 
 92. Dari-Mattiacci & De Geest, Multiplication Effect, supra note 7, at 366. 
 93. See id. at 368. 
 94. Cf. id. at 376 (noting that the advantage of sticks is smaller when agents act coop-
eratively to resist). 
 95. See Engel et al., supra note 7, at 669. 
 96. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., ADDITIONAL STEPS ARE NEEDED 
TO PREVENT AND RECOVER ERRONEOUS CLAIMS FOR THE FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER CREDIT 4-
11 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2010reports/201041069fr 
.pdf. On the opportunistic behavior of carrot recipients, see Ferraro, supra note 82, at 811. 
 97. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 
287 (“[T]here is little basis for thinking that the management costs associated with one type 
of market mechanism . . . are materially lower than those associated with other types . . . .”). 
Of course, actors may not expend the same effort to pursue gain as to avoid loss if they 
are more averse to losses than they are attracted to gains. But firms, at least, are typically 
held by a diversified group of shareholders and so are risk-neutral. See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19 
(1986). 
 98. See De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots Versus Sticks, supra note 7, at 17, 22. 
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tional penalties for that.99 So a stick regime will have fewer actors “in the sys-
tem,” which, all else being equal, should lower administrative costs. On the 
other hand, De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci argue, sticks may be costlier under 
some assumptions, so that it is possible carrots carry lower costs overall.100 
One final way in which sticks can be more cost-effective than carrots is in 
their propensity to trigger loss aversion. Again, many studies have found that 
people are particularly attached to what they perceive as their existing baseline, 
and they fear changes that are framed as “losses” more acutely than they desire 
“gains.”101 I put both terms in quotation marks because, again, the perception 
of a policy as a carrot or stick can be subjective. The psychologically important 
baseline is not always the present state of the world; it may instead be deter-
mined by some other prominent event, such as purchase price. Wall Street trad-
ers, for example, have been found willing to take far bigger risks to avoid fall-
ing below the price they paid for an asset than they are willing to take in order 
to turn a profit.102 As a result, the threat of a stick can change behavior consid-
erably more than a carrot of equivalent size. It is worth emphasizing, though, 
that because loss aversion depends on the subjective framing of the policy in-
strument, its benefits can be transitory. 
So far, then, sticks look like a bargain compared to carrots. They cost less, 
and often produce a larger effect per dollar.  
2. Income and output effects 
As for income effects, in most cases it seems clear that using carrots will 
undermine efforts to curtail negative externalities. If the externality-producing 
good is a normal good, paying consumers of the good not to produce it will in-
crease their demand for it via the income effect, even as the substitution effect 
drives demand down.103 If you pay me not to pollute (say, by selling my 
clunker), I’m richer. But energy consumption is a normal good, and now I have 
more money for a nice big new air conditioner. So a carrot wasn’t the best 
choice; if you had fined me instead, both the income and substitution effects 
would have worked in the same direction. As I’ve already described, output ef-
 
 99. Cf. POSNER, supra note 48, at 282 (arguing that efficient criminal law adds pun-
ishment for efforts to conceal crime). 
100. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots Versus Sticks, supra note 7, at 23-24. Some of 
the potential costs include not only pure administrative losses, but also unwanted redistribu-
tion from those who cannot easily comply with a penalty regime to those who can. Id. 
On the other hand, as Henry Smith explains, multi-attribute goods are especially expen-
sive to monitor when we use subsidies, because of the added possibility that producers will 
manipulate quantity or quality to extract more subsidies per unit of the subsidized good. See 
Smith, supra note 65, at 698-700. 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54. 
102. See Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and 
Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777, 782 (1985). 
103. See STERNER, supra note 7, at 167. 
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fects for firms function similarly, with the reduction in output from a stick 
aligning with its substitution effects to drive down production of the              
externality.104 
In the rare case of an “inferior” good—a good we want less as our income 
increases—income effects make carrots more appealing. For example, re-
searchers have found that “pirated” software is an inferior good.105 That sug-
gests that penalizing users of pirated intellectual property may be an inefficient 
enforcement choice. Giving poor families (or, often, students) bonuses if they 
switch to licensed products could be more effective. By enriching the knockoff-
using household the policy would also increase its demand for the “legal” 
product. Further, because these households have few resources, even small 
changes in price can add up to enough to make for significant income effects. 
3. Distributive considerations 
Turning to the third of our analytic tools, sticks also seem to better reflect 
moral intuitions about the fair distribution of the costs of preventing negative 
externalities. We can pay banks that brought down our economy to take smaller 
systemic risks in the future, but there is something distasteful about rewarding 
the folks who damaged their neighbors in the first place.106 Indeed, proponents 
of some punishment systems, such as tort law, explicitly defend those systems 
on the basis that society needs a mechanism for expressing its disapproval.107 
These theorists claim either that expressing disapproval of “wrong” behavior is 
morally required, or that in the absence of formal disapproval we would see il-
legitimate and even violent self-help efforts.108 Admittedly, though, the moral 
intuitions point may be redundant. Some intuitions might themselves rely on 
the underlying efficiency considerations that make up my other arguments. 
Another important aspect of the distributive question is that sticks may be 
undesirable when they fall on households that are poorer than average.109 
 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67. 
105. See Trisha L. Bezmen & Craig A. Depken II, Influences on Software Piracy: Evi-
dence from the Various United States, 90 ECON. LETTERS 356, 359 (2006). 
106. See R. Glenn Hubbard et al., Banks Need Fewer Carrots and More Sticks, WALL 
ST. J., May 6, 2009, at A15. For the history of the development of a similar norm in the envi-
ronmental context, see Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable 
Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 
467-78 (2000). 
107. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process 
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 532-58 (2005); Jason 
M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 1784-1811 
(2009); see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998). 
108. See Goldberg, supra note 107, at 602-03. 
109. Or, more generally, when a stick program combined with dedicated spending from 
the stick-generated revenues is on net regressive. 
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Whether as a matter of efficiency or some other basis of social justice, we tend 
to want government programs to transfer wealth overall from those with more 
to those with less.110 When the opposite happens, the social benefits from cur-
tailing negative externalities stand in tension with our preference for distribu-
tive fairness.111 Poorer households may also lack access to ready means of sav-
ing, borrowing, or planning their budgets, making them especially vulnerable to 
temporary changes in prices.112 These regressivity complaints are a common 
source of criticism of taxes on alcohol and cigarettes.113 
Using sticks against poor households can also lead to over- or 
underdeterrence. Kaplow and Shavell argue that a household so poor as to be 
judgment-proof cannot be adequately deterred, leading to underdeterrence.114 
This argument appears to overlook the possibility that small changes in wealth 
for the indigent translate into large changes in utility. If poorer households are 
more sensitive than average to any given price change, sticks priced based on 
the assumption that the average payee is of average wealth may actually turn 
 
Imperfect enforcement can also lead to redistribution, when carrots or sticks are applied 
to only a subset of the producer population. But under realistic assumptions, this effect ap-
pears no more likely under carrots than under sticks. See De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots 
Versus Sticks, supra note 7, at 18, 22-23. 
110. The efficiency case for redistribution in favor of the poor is based on the diminish-
ing marginal utility of wealth. That is, the richer people already are, the less each additional 
dollar gained or lost is worth in utility terms. For example, if Josephine has $1000 and loses 
$500, she is in serious trouble, and may face hunger or eviction. If she has $1 million and 
loses $500, she is a little bummed. 
111. There remains a lively debate over whether designers of legal rules should be con-
cerned about distributional effects, or whether instead all distributive considerations should 
simply be taken care of in the income tax system. Compare Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994), and David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Re-
distribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 446-53 (2003), with Richard S. Markovits, Why 
Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion Argument” Articles Are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 511, 550-55 (2005), Brett H. McDonnell, The Economists’ New Arguments, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 86, 111 (2003), and Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Effi-
ciency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1006-11 (2001). I tend to agree with those who 
argue that legal rules should account for distributive considerations, for reasons including 
those I have explained elsewhere. Brian Galle, Is Local Consumer Protection Law a Better 
Redistributive Mechanism than the Tax System?, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 530-40 
(2010).  
112. For a survey of the evidence on these points, see Galle & Utset, supra note 62, at 
48-60, 78-82. 
113. See Andrew J. Haile, Sin Taxes: When the State Becomes the Sinner, 82 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1041, 1050 (2009) (summarizing these arguments). It is not entirely clear that the criti-
cism is cogent. The consumer, or at least her future self, suffers a large portion of the harm 
from tobacco and alcohol, but may simply lack the willpower to stop. These harms can be 
thought of as “internalities.” If the diminishing marginal utility of wealth makes the sin tax’s 
bite sharper, it is the consumer herself who benefits more. 
114. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 45, at 739-40. 
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out to inefficiently overdeter poorer payees.115 But Kaplow and Shavell are 
likely right that at some point, as wealth approaches zero or the limits of avail-
able credit or insurance, households can no longer be deterred further. So there 
is a somewhat unpredictable, inverted U-shaped deterrence curve as producer 
wealth declines. 
As a result, carrots are more defensible when used to reduce negative ex-
ternalities produced by the indigent.116 Many proponents of carbon pricing 
have in essence adopted this path. A variety of plans now on the table would 
rebate to poor consumers the increase in the national average annual cost of 
goods purchased resulting from carbon abatement by producers.117 Although 
nominally still a stick, this approach has many of the features of a carrot. Poor-
er households still face higher marginal costs from carbon-intensive goods, but 
families that consume less carbon than average will get richer on net.118 The 
rebate also saps much of the revenue gain from implementing a carbon tax, and 
could even reduce government revenues overall under some assumptions.119 
Is this an improvement over a straight carbon tax? Maybe—if the social 
gains from redistribution exceed the revenue-raising costs and the impact of the 
income effect, which will be especially noticeable in these poor households. 
Another potential downside is that an explicit government policy to grant car-
rots to poor producers might lead markets inefficiently to shift externality-
producing assets to lower-wealth buyers. But given the small buying power of 
the poorest households, this is not likely to produce large distortions. 
In the opposite case, carrots are particularly difficult to defend when they 
will be collected mostly by those who are wealthier than the average taxpayer. 
Many critics of tax expenditures make this point, since the structure of most tax 
subsidies is such that they are more valuable to households with the highest 
 
115. See Muradian et al., supra note 82, at 1204; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 913 (1998). 
Presumably, carrots also are disproportionately tempting for poorer households. But this can 
be an advantage for policymakers, since it allows the government to achieve the desired 
marginal effects with a smaller outlay. 
116. See Engel et al., supra note 7, at 672 (suggesting that subsidies can help to allevi-
ate poverty). 
117. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
§ 431 (2009); Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 5, at 513-14 & n.66; Metcalf, supra note 88, 
at 664. 
118. See Md Rumi Shammin & Clark W. Bullard, Impact of Cap-and-Trade Policies 
for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions on U.S. Households, 68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2432, 
2437 (2009). 
119. Cf. Terry Dinan & Diane Lim Rogers, Distributional Effects of Carbon Allowance 
Trading: How Government Decisions Determine Winners and Losers, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 199, 
206 (2002) (modeling revenue effects of rebate proposals). Basically, the rebate would cost 
more than the tax if the tax were very effective at getting producers to reduce carbon in ways 
that resulted in no tax paid but were still expensive for the producers, and the producers 
passed these costs on to customers. 
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marginal tax rates.120 Under a progressive tax, that means the subsidy is most 
valuable to the richest taxpayers.121 
4. Repeated-game incentives 
Finally, other commentators have argued that once we consider the incen-
tive effects of a policy instrument as a repeated game over time, carrots emerge 
as a relatively disastrous choice for containing negative externalities. But as I 
will show, the argument is more nuanced than prior writers have assumed. As I 
mentioned earlier, Coase recognized that the possibility of obtaining carrots can 
tempt new entrants into the externality-producing market so that they can then 
be paid to stop.122 Similarly, scholars have noted that carrots “crowd out” vol-
untary reduction efforts: existing producers will not voluntarily invest in cur-
tailing externalities, because they know that any reductions they make on their 
own will not be compensated.123 To the extent producers are “inframarginal” in 
this way—that is, they would have reduced negative externalities on their own 
(or never produced them in the first place)—the funds spent on carrots are 
wasted.124 
Even the expectation that carrots might be forthcoming can cause crowd-
out.125 For example, suppose a business can make an improvement in its pro-
duction line that both increases the line’s capacity and also would make it 
cheaper to reduce its carbon emissions. But suppose in addition that the gov-
ernment is considering offering a tax incentive for emission reductions. If the 
firm waits until after introduction of the credit to make its change, the govern-
 
120. E.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 136 (1973). 
121. Id. 
122. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
123. E.g., Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 21, at 25; Engel et al., supra note 7, at 670. 
124. See Engel et al., supra note 7, at 670. There are a number of reasons producers 
might mitigate negative externalities in the absence of a subsidy. Some changes in business 
processes can both benefit the firm and also reduce externalities (think of switching from an 
outmoded coal power plant to a modernized hydrothermal one). Absent government action, 
private actors subject to the externality might bargain directly with the producer. Finally, the 
producer might altruistically avoid harming its neighbors. Although few firms likely act out 
of feelings of altruism held by their principals, being perceived as “eco-friendly” or “dol-
phin-safe” also has branding benefits. 
De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci appear to argue that inframarginality, or what they call 
“overpayment,” can be reduced by tailoring the amount of the carrot to an individual pro-
ducer’s cost of production. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots Versus Sticks, supra note 7, 
at 20. But, as they acknowledge, this works only when the government has perfect infor-
mation. Id. at 21-24. Considering that producers can manipulate the information available to 
the government, and that if carrots vary with their effort cost then producers would have a 
strong incentive to engage in manipulation, that is a large assumption. But it may not be im-
plausible. For a discussion of how the government can elicit information producers would 
prefer to keep concealed, see the text accompanying notes 142-43 below. 
125. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 7, at 212. 
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ment funds the alteration; if the firm acts now, it must pay itself. In all likeli-
hood, the firm waits. Thus, hoping for carrots could not only slow mitigation of 
the externality but also inefficiently distort production processes. 
A related problem, as the literature on legal transitions teaches, is that car-
rot-like rules create moral hazard, encouraging overinvestment in externality-
producing activities by actors who have better information than the govern-
ment.126 If the government has pledged to compensate those who lose when it 
changes its rules, actors who know before the government does that they are 
producing negative externalities have no incentive to curb their production.127 
Consider mortgage lenders who held a large portfolio of risky loans. It’s a fa-
miliar point that these firms had little reason to concern themselves about the 
dangers widespread failure might pose to the housing and credit markets.128 
Because they expected to be “bailed out” in the event of a sharp decline in rev-
enues, though, they were also indifferent to risk of a different kind. It was rea-
sonable for those firms to expect that, if a significant number of their loans 
went bad, governments would toughen protections for homeowners to prevent a 
downward spiral in real estate markets.129 But lenders seem to have taken few 
steps to ensure that their portfolios could stand up to the closer government 
scrutiny a housing crisis would bring.130 
Sticks look superior in all three of these scenarios. Sticks do not attract new 
investment to a regulated industry. More importantly, the prospect of a guaran-
teed stick motivates producers to anticipate potential government responses and 
reduce investment in negative externality-producing activities in advance of the 
penalty itself.131 In effect, the government gets some reduction for free, be-
cause reduction begins before enforcement efforts are paid for. It also gets re-
ductions sooner than it might otherwise, which can be especially valuable for 
“stock” pollutants that build up over time. Moreover, since producers often 
have better information than the government about their own processes, a pro-
ducer that can predict its activities might be subject to sticks may change its 
 
126. Wiener, supra note 7, at 726. 
127. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 529-31 (1986); see also Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for 
Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 590-92 (1984) (pointing out that 
guaranteed compensation for government takings induces overinvestment in property likely 
to be subject to regulation). 
128. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008) (describing 
how externalities contributed to the financial crisis). 
129. Foreclosures produce downward spirals because homeowners are more likely to 
default when the value of their home is less than their outstanding mortgage. Since foreclo-
sures in a neighborhood drive down prices of neighboring homes (the negative externality 
that motivates government intervention), a few foreclosures can trigger a cascade. See Anna 
Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1125-26 (2009). 
130. See id. at 1102-03, 1127 (noting deliberate use of inflexible mortgage securitiza-
tion contracts by lenders). 
131. POSNER, supra note 48, at 68-69. 
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behavior even before the government has identified the harm.132 There is evi-
dence, though, that punishments can sometimes “crowd out” altruistic behavior, 
just as carrots can.133 
Carrots are perhaps more palatable in the case of unanticipated new dan-
gers. If producers cannot anticipate the coming carrot, there is no moral haz-
ard.134 Some scholars go so far as to argue that imposing sticks on activities 
that producers could not have known would be later deemed harmful will re-
duce investment in productive activities overall.135 Risk- or uncertainty-averse 
investors might be reluctant to sink money into ventures with unknowable risk, 
especially since by definition an unforetold event cannot easily be insured 
against.136 It’s unclear, though, whether any hazards are really unforeseeable in 
this way.137 In any event, this argument for carrots at best applies to preexisting 
investments; carrots or compensation can be offered to holders of sunk invest-
ments, while sticks remain the better choice for those who create the new perils 
going forward. 
Another reason to consider carrots in some contexts is their effect on the 
incentives of producers to reveal their private information. Both carrots and 
sticks give producers incentives to invest in learning about potential negative 
externalities in advance of government regulation.138 The producer will want to 
avoid investments that might subject it to sticks, while shifting toward invest-
 
132. See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1657, 1663 (1999). 
133. See Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the 
Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 658-59 
(1999) (summarizing their meta-analysis of other studies); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do 
Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?, 30-31 (Inst. for Empirical Re-
search in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 34, 2002) (finding larger crowding-out 
effect for penalties than for bonuses), available at http://www.iew.uzh.ch/wp/iewwp034.pdf. 
134. See Kaplow, supra note 127, at 551-52.  
135. See, e.g., Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 269. 
136. In effect, the carrot substitutes for unavailable private insurance. Promising to use 
a carrot takes the cost of the risk of newly discovered dangers off of producers, and distrib-
utes it to society as a whole. This risk-spreading is efficient because of the diminishing mar-
ginal utility of wealth: when everyone in society suffers a small loss, the total social utility 
lost is less than if one person suffered a loss of the same total size. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE 
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39 (1970). Typically, moral hazard is a serious concern with these 
forms of implied government bailouts. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Mar-
kets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 390 (2000). 
But by assumption, we have no moral hazard in the unforeseeable-risk scenario.  
The analysis is similar if we shift from wholly unforeseeable to nearly unforeseeable 
events. Low-probability outcomes remain difficult to privately insure against because the 
transaction costs of insurance will eat up any risk-spreading gains. Kaplow, supra note 127, 
at 594. While moral hazard will not be zero, it will still be very small. Thus, we do not need 
to distinguish much between different degrees of near unforeseeability.  
137. Even if hazards were unforeseeable, it might be argued that the expected change in 
behavior from outcomes that cannot be predicted would be small, since the cost of far-future 
events would be heavily discounted. POSNER, supra note 48, at 69. 
138. See Levmore, supra note 132, at 1663. 
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ments that might result in carrots. If regulation is expected to take the form of a 
stick, though, the producer is likely to conceal its information in order to stave 
off regulation.139 Tobacco companies hiding health research and energy pro-
ducers fighting over climate change science are only two among many promi-
nent examples here. Producers expecting carrots, on the other hand, have every 
reason to share information about the extent of the harms they are producing; 
the larger the harms, the larger the carrot.140 Of course, this also raises the dan-
ger that the producer will exaggerate the size of the harm; but on the theory that 
some information is better than none, the government may find this outcome 
preferable.141 
If revealing private information is important, the policy prescription looks 
similar to the recommendation of transitions theory. “Incumbent” or existing 
producers might be offered some degree of carrot to encourage them to reveal 
information.142 Given the generally dire incentive effects of widespread carrots, 
though, rewards for information should be narrow and carefully tailored.143 For 
instance, governments might offer a “whistleblower” reward to the first firm to 
come forward with significant new data. The reward would give each producer 
a strong incentive to defect from any cartel of silence, while leaving the overall 
ex ante expected likelihood of a stick for each individual producer fairly high. 
If, as would typically be the case, a whistleblower does not internalize the im-
pact of the information she reveals on others in her industry, then the carrot of-
fered to the defector can be much smaller than the carrot that would have to be 
offered to the whole of the cartel. 
 
139. Cf. id. at 1665 (noting that parties who anticipate regulation that disadvantages 
them may work to delay its implementation). Probably the more complete way of stating this 
point is that producers will choose among strategies involving mixes of concealment, lobby-
ing, and real change. If change is cheaper than concealment and lobbying, the producer may 
simply change. But given the government’s difficulty in gathering private information, it 
seems plausible that concealment will often be a low-cost strategy—unless the government 
penalizes it. More on that in a moment. 
140. See Ferraro, supra note 82, at 811. 
141. Cf. Chang, supra note 18, at 310-24 (arguing that nations offered carrots by other 
nations will overestimate the costs of environmental mitigation, while sticks will not have 
this effect); Hanson & Logue, supra note 61, at 1274 n.458 (arguing that the government 
should probably not ignore information from producers, even if it is suspected to be false, 
because producers have more information). 
142. See STERNER, supra note 7, at 159 (offering bottle deposits as an example of an in-
formation-revealing carrot); Ferraro, supra note 82, at 812 (suggesting separating equilibri-
um contracts or auctions to screen out exaggerators). 
143. Even if carrots are available to all incumbents, at some point new information is 
only marginally useful, and so latecomers should get sticks. To eliminate competitive ad-
vantages for incumbents, policy can shift so that every producer faces sticks over time. In-
cumbents may rationally predict that eventually the government will transition to sticks. As-
suming any degree of time discounting on their part, though, the fact that sticks arrive rather 
later than carrots should make them more amenable to revealing their private information.  
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The literature on repeated games, then, strongly counsels against carrots, 
with the possible exception of narrowly targeted incentives for disclosure. As 
I’ll now explain, however, the repeated-game story isn’t yet complete.  
5. Repeated games and mitigation 
One final aspect of strategic behavior other commentators have neglected 
is that carrots might also lead to more efficient behavior on the part of those 
who suffer from negative externalities, although in many cases the pro-
efficiency effects will be small. The impact of many negative externalities can 
be mitigated if the victims change their own behavior,144 as in the classic case 
in which farmers can set their crops back farther from passing trains.145 When 
that is the case, the most efficient legal rule is typically one that incentivizes 
both parties to minimize the net social cost of avoiding the harm, sometimes 
called “double liability at the margins.” 
Carrots can motivate victims to mitigate, and it is possible that they do so 
more than a comparable stick would. Carrots must be paid for, of course, often 
through taxes or fees imposed on victims. Since the size of the carrot will usu-
ally be determined at least in part by the marginal social cost of each unit of ex-
ternality produced, each taxpayer must pay more as the costs of the externality 
increase.146 If a taxpayer can take actions to reduce the damage from that ex-
ternality, she can thereby reduce her tax bill, thus giving her incentives to miti-
gate.147 It is easy to see, though, why this effect would typically be small, since 
a large portion of the mitigation effort undertaken by any one taxpayer would 
itself be a positive externality for her fellow citizens. 
In some situations the mitigation incentives of carrots could be larger. Sup-
pose, for instance, that a given carrot is funded from a small pool of victims di-
rectly subject to the externality, such as might be true in the case of local gov-
 
144. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 45, at 738. 
145. See POSNER, supra note 48, at 63-67 (discussing the train example). 
146. Cf. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 127, at 590-91 (observing that tax payments to 
fund compensated takings are the equivalent of insurance premiums). 
147. For instance, suppose five farmers live near a railroad track. The railroad does 
$100 in damage to each farmer’s crops by using a cheap, spark-prone engine. To discourage 
the railroad from operating in that risky manner, the farmers each pay a tax of $100 to the 
government, which then pays the railroad to cease. Now, suppose that each farmer can move 
his crops far enough from the tracks to avoid any damage. If any one farmer mitigates, total 
damage drops to $400, making the per-farmer tax only $80. 
This point is similar to the argument sometimes made in favor of requiring the govern-
ment to pay when its regulations reduce the value of a regulated party’s property: if the gov-
ernment must internalize the budget costs of both sides of the externality ledger, it will only 
regulate when regulation increases total welfare. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 127, at 
620-22.  
Kaplow and Shavell hint at a similar idea, stating in passing that “property rule protec-
tion of injurers’ right to cause harm” would give victims “strong incentives to avoid expo-
sure.” Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 45, at 739.  
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ernment regulation. Or suppose that the tax system is highly progressive and 
falls heavily on just a few taxpayers. In those cases, the fiscal externality from 
mitigation is relatively smaller, and so we might expect to see a fair amount of 
mitigation, especially if the payers can use social norms or other institutions to 
coordinate their efforts to produce positive fiscal externalities for one anoth-
er.148 Alternatively, if the cost of mitigation is low enough that it is less than a 
victim’s proportional tax savings, she may mitigate irrespective of the benefit 
to others.149 
Existing literature assumes that sticks designed properly can also produce 
double liability at the margins, but these analyses overlook some situations in 
which the standard prescription doesn’t work. The familiar analysis assumes 
that compensation paid directly to the victim would undermine incentives to 
mitigate.150 To avoid this, economists recommend that victims not receive the 
proceeds from sticks themselves—for example, by requiring that the proceeds 
be paid to the government as a fine—giving victims an incentive to mitigate 
when mitigation is less costly than the damage done by the externality.151 
 
148. For a discussion of the role of group cohesion and social institutions in coordinat-
ing for the production of public goods, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 26-54, 185-214 (1990); Robert C. 
Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 78-90 (1998); and 
Wolfgang Stroebe & Bruno S. Frey, Self-Interest and Collective Action: The Economics and 
Psychology of Public Goods, 21 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 131-35 (1982).  
149. More precisely, and putting aside any game-theory-inspired interactions with the 
incentives of other victims, an individual victim mitigates where mitigation costs are less 
than the damage per victim divided by the number of taxpayer-victims. That situation is 
probably unusual, since if mitigation is cheaper than voters’ proportional share of the tax, 
they presumably would mitigate rather than vote for the tax. But there might be some heter-
ogeneity in mitigation expenses or tax burden. Returning to our farmer example, suppose it 
costs only $15 for one of the farmers to move crops away from the fiery tracks. Since that 
farmer can now pay $15 to achieve a $20 tax savings, she will do so (unless she believes that 
by not mitigating she can induce other farmers to mitigate). Note, though, that if there were 
ten farmers, the total tax would be $1000, and mitigation by one farmer would still save 
$100. Each farmer’s individual mitigation efforts therefore reduce each tax bill by only $10, 
meaning that mitigation would no longer be cost-effective, even for the low-cost farmer. 
Again, then, mitigation incentives depend on the size of the group of taxpayer-victims.  
150. E.g., BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 7, at 230-31; see Wittman, supra note 7, at 67-
68 (examining this point in the tort context). 
151. E.g., Wittman, supra note 7, at 67-68. To see this, consider a house husband who 
is hanging his laundry outside to dry. Suppose that it costs him $1 in quarters and wasted 
time to dry them at the laundromat instead. Suppose also that factory smoke causes $2 in 
damage to shirts left outside. What if the husband is not compensated for his damaged shirts, 
but instead the factory pays a fine? Then he will dry them at the laundromat, because each 
damaged shirt leaves him out $2, which is more than the cost of quarters. But what if he is 
compensated by the factory? Then he leaves the shirts outside and collects the money. In that 
scenario, the husband loses $2 and gains $2, for a net of zero per shirt, while laundering rep-
resents a loss of $1 per shirt. This could be a socially inefficient result—for example, if it 
would cost the factory more than $1 per shirt to avoid the damage, and $1 has the same utili-
ty value for factory investors and shirt washers.  
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This analysis appears to neglect the likelihood that fines are not simply 
wasted, but instead enter the government treasury. Fines paid to the govern-
ment in effect are therefore shared by all taxpayers, so that if taxpayers and vic-
tims overlap, victims still get some payment. If each victim’s share of the tax 
windfall equals or exceeds the marginal damage they suffer, their incentives to 
mitigate diminish, because in effect they are being compensated directly by the 
externality producer.152 Indeed, if there were no transaction costs, then wherev-
er marginal damage and tax gains are each distributed equally, fines are math-
ematically indistinguishable from direct compensation of the victim.153 The 
same is true for any individual whose proportionate shares of the marginal 
damage and of the tax base are identical.  
Sticks are also less than optimally effective at encouraging mitigation when 
victims recognize that their own behavior provides information to the govern-
ment. If victims mitigate, then the efficient stick amount will decline, reflecting 
a lower marginal social cost.154 Once victims reveal that they can mitigate, so-
ciety will reduce the stick menacing producers, resulting in greater production 
of the externality and hence more cost to victims, whether in damage or mitiga-
tion costs. Victims may be willing to absorb some of the cost of not mitigating 
to avoid this shifting of costs.155 
 
152. Consider the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), an insurance pool for 
banks funded by banks. Suppose we have ten banks contributing to the pool and that total 
operating costs are $100 million annually. Say also that if any one bank defaults it jeopardiz-
es the operations of other banks, for instance by worrying depositors and causing withdraw-
als and even runs, costing each other bank $5 million. So let us now say that the FDIC im-
poses a fine of $45 million (9 × $5 million) on a bank that defaults, payable to the funding 
pool. In effect, then, a default by one bank fully compensates each other bank by reducing 
their individual shares of the annual operating costs of the pool from $10 million to $5 mil-
lion. If banks can, at some cost, reduce their exposure to damage from a competitor’s de-
fault, this is an inefficient result, because banks will have no incentive to invest in             
mitigation. 
153. To illustrate, imagine a $100 million fine on a water polluter, shared equally 
among 100 million taxpayers nationwide. Presumably the fine is set at this level because the 
marginal damage is also $100 million. If each taxpayer experiences an equal amount of that 
harm, their net cost or benefit from the pollution and fine is zero ($1 in tax saved less $1 in 
damage). If the mitigation is at all costly—say, the price of a Brita filter—then no taxpayer 
has any incentive to mitigate. 
A more likely scenario is that some households, such as those with children, are more 
vulnerable. Households bearing a disproportionate share of the marginal damage may suffer 
a net loss as a result of the combined pollution and fine, and therefore conceivably have 
some incentives to mitigate. But other portions of the population still would not. 
Transaction costs somewhat weaken the equivalence, because they presumably would 
reduce the amount of net revenue benefits from imposing a fine. But on the other hand if 
fines permit lower tax rates then society experiences less deadweight tax loss. 
154. Cf. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Nuno Garoupa, Least-Cost Avoidance: The Trage-
dy of Common Safety, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 235, 258 (2007) (noting that victims’ failure to 
mitigate is itself a negative fiscal externality imposed on producers). 
155. I should acknowledge that carrots can also encourage victims to conceal their abil-
ity to mitigate. However, once we recognize that victims help to fund carrots, it is evident 
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Of course, this scenario assumes a level of foresight and cohesion that may 
be seldom encountered in the real world. One reason such cohesion is scarce is 
that when victims’ ability to mitigate is relatively similar, then any one victim’s 
decision to mitigate imposes a new negative externality on all the other victims. 
That is, once the government knows mitigation is possible for anyone, it might 
assume that it’s equally possible for everyone. When the size of this informa-
tional externality is substantial, such as when the product of the cost of mitiga-
tion and the number of potential victims is large, then we should expect to see a 
fair amount of overmitigation from the perspective of the group of victims.  
But victims might be able to coordinate to conceal their mitigation poten-
tial. Cooperation within a group is more likely when one group is competing 
against another group.156 That arguably is the case when sticks are applied, 
since victims and producers are competing to see who can force the govern-
ment to impose costs on the other.  
Given that victims may sometimes successfully conceal information about 
their ability to mitigate, we should probably consider tools for discouraging 
concealment. Information about mitigation closely resembles the scenarios I 
described earlier involving data held by externality producers. So here as there, 
policymakers may want to examine policies for encouraging whistleblowers. 
Summing up the mitigation analysis, it looks as though there is an argu-
ment that carrots might actually be preferable to sticks on this front, especially 
when the group of victims is small. For the several reasons I mentioned, a rela-
tively small group of victims makes it more plausible that the revenue cost of 
paying out carrots will motivate the victims to mitigate. On the stick side, small 
groups reduce the size of the externality imposed on the group when one of the 
victims mitigates, and make it easier for the group to coordinate their cartel of 
silence. In other words, a small group of victims in a stick regime is more likely 
to hold together and pretend that they cannot easily mitigate. So the compara-
tive advantage of carrots is at its apex when the circle of victims is drawn in 
tight, because then carrots are most likely to give incentives to mitigate while 
sticks are least likely to do so. 
 
that the problem is more significant for sticks. Since victims bear a portion of the cost of the 
carrot, they internalize at least some of society’s total cost of mitigating the externality, mak-
ing them more likely to prefer the most efficient result. For example, if victims fully inter-
nalize the cost, they will always prefer to assign mitigation to the least-cost avoider. They 
therefore would have no economic interest in concealing their costs of mitigation.  
156. See Gary Bornstein & Meyrav Ben-Yossef, Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-
Group Social Dilemmas, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 52, 63 (1994). In part this is 
because in that setting groups use greater intragroup incentives to force cooperation, id., and 
in part it may result from psychological pressure to conform, id. at 64. 
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B. Examples 
Now that we have assembled these basic policy tools, it becomes clear that 
a large number of existing subsidies are misguided. As the environmental law 
literature recognizes, price supports for energy conservation or efficiency, rang-
ing from renewable energy tax credits to loan guarantees for nuclear power and 
price supports for corn farmers, can and should all be replaced with pollution 
pricing.157 More controversially, if excessive spending on politics creates nega-
tive externalities, such as by coarsening public debate and crowding out the 
voices of the poorer and less powerful, then taxes on campaign contributions or 
expenditures would likely be a more efficient alternative to the public financing 
or free television time offered in some places.158 Exacting a special premium 
from homeowners who build in flood and hurricane zones would be wiser than 
the current policy of offering them subsidized disaster insurance.159 In all of 
these cases, sticks would economize on federal revenues, leverage income ef-
fects to reduce externality production, and encourage behavioral changes in ad-
vance of the policy’s implementation. 
Another policy worth discussing, if only because of its vast size, is the re-
tirement system. The federal government annually gives up more than $100 bil-
lion in revenues in order to encourage workers to save for retirement, a massive 
carrot larger than almost any other.160 Yet the case for retirement carrots is 
hardly clear cut. Retirement savings arguably avoid the fiscal externality that 
would result if society had to care for those who could not afford to care for 
themselves.161 So the activity that produces the negative externality is the 
 
157. For consideration of whether subsidies might be defensible because they are more 
politically achievable, see text accompanying notes 260-66 below. 
158. On the question of whether price regulation would be better in this context than 
command-and-control regulation, such as caps on spending, see David S. Gamage, Note, 
Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in Campaign Finance, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1283, 1296-321 (2004). Whether such a policy would be constitutional is a different 
question, which I leave for others.  
159. For a description of the National Flood Insurance Program and its struggles with 
moral hazard, see JUSTIN R. PIDOT, COASTAL DISASTER INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL 
WARMING 12-17 (2007). 
160. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014, at 49 (Comm. Print 2010). Some commenta-
tors would argue that the benefits for retirement savings are not subsidies, but instead should 
be viewed as a step towards a normatively correct tax system in which all savings are un-
taxed. Compare Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good 
Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 421-22 (1984) (concluding the 
current tax treatment of qualified pension plans is a subsidy), with Edward A. Zelinsky, The 
Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. REV. 
315, 315-16 (1988) (concluding the current tax treatment of qualified pension plans is not a 
tax expenditure). This illustrates again the normative instability of any given baseline. My 
point here is only that retirement preferences depart from the current baseline in which most 
saving is taxed.  
161. See POSNER, supra note 48, at 638-39 (noting burdens of poverty on altruists). 
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household’s decision to consume its income immediately rather than save it. 
But consumption is typically a normal good. As a result, offering carrots to 
those who do not consume is inefficient, as the income effect of the carrot 
works against the substitution effect of the incentive.162 A better alternative, 
then, would be taxing consumption. A number of tax scholars have called for 
the United States to move to taxing only consumption,163 but relative to the 
current policy that would be a fairly ineffective way of increasing overall sav-
ings: it’s just an even bigger carrot. To unambiguously increase savings relative 
to today, these proposals would have to either retain the income tax and add a 
consumption tax on top, or ramp up their tax rates to ensure that today’s con-
sumers (who pay an income tax) will face a higher total tax tomorrow (when 
they pay only a consumption tax). 
Turning back to the carbon tax, opponents argue that it is unfairly regres-
sive, but the recent example of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)164 offers a les-
son on how to reconcile policy preferences for sticks with distributive justice 
concerns. The ACA is an incredibly complex piece of legislation with many 
moving parts.165 One of its key goals, though, is curbing a fiscal externality: 
the costs of caring for the uninsured or underinsured.166 As readers surely 
know, the statute does that by imposing a tax on moderate- and high-earners 
who fail to purchase qualifying insurance, and by granting a subsidy to poorer 
households to help them do so.167 
Although it has been the incentive to purchase insurance that has drawn po-
litical fire and lawsuits, the ACA’s bigger innovation was the decision to hy-
bridize two different policy instruments. In effect, the ACA offers a combina-
tion of two policy instruments for one common problem, with poor households 
getting a carrot while everyone else faces a stick. For most of the population, 
the stick was a better policy choice: it corrects a difficult policy problem with-
out significant net expenditures of public funds. And, assuming that we define 
the problem as the overconsumption of health care services, the income effect 
 
162. GRUBER, supra note 11, at 650. 
163. E.g., Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consump-
tion Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1455 (2006). 
164. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code), amended by Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
165. For an accessible summary, see HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF 
NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/ 
8061.pdf. 
166. See SENATE DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT DETAILED SUMMARY 1 (2009), available at http://dpc.senate.gov/ 
healthreformbill/healthbill04.pdf. 
167. The legislation expands Medicaid eligibility to all non-Medicare qualified adults 
earning less than 133% of the federal poverty limit, and offers subsidies toward private in-
surance for households between 133% and 400% of the federal poverty limit. HENRY J. 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 165, at 1-2.  
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of a subsidy would have exacerbated the problem.168 For poorer families, 
though, a stick would have been a difficult and perhaps unenforceable (or at 
least uncollectible) burden. And any ethical arguments about “free riding” seem 
rather thin for workers already struggling to pay their bills without health care 
benefits. Rather than simply convert the entire program to a carrot, though, the 
legislation used carrots only to the extent that they were justified by distributive 
considerations. That structure gets the best of both instruments, avoiding the 
waste of giving carrots to those who can fairly be saddled with the cost of re-
ducing externalities. 
Using limited and means-tested carrots together with a larger stick program 
also can resolve some distributive concerns over other major policies now on 
the table. As I’ve mentioned, carbon-tax proponents suggest a similar transfer 
of new tax funds to the poorest households.169 Other economists recommend 
combining a possible sugar or fat tax with subsidies to help poor families buy 
produce.170 
The lessons of the ACA and my prior analysis also help to shed some light 
on the problem of traffic.171 Some localities have tried to overcome traffic by 
using carrots: not, to return to Beverly Hills Cop, by jamming them in tail-
pipes,172 but instead by offering discounts on tolls for commuters who car-
pool.173 Commentators and mayors have also suggested the alternative of 
“congestion pricing,” or charging drivers extra to travel during peak hours.174 
As with the ACA’s mandate, congestion pricing would have a disproportionate 
burden on workers with low incomes and inflexible schedules.175 But, rather 
than abandoning congestion pricing altogether, we could mitigate this unwant-
 
168. Another aspect of underinsurance, of course, is that being even partially uninsured 
is harmful for one’s health and peace of mind. Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health 
Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 17,190, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17190.pdf. Ar-
guably, it should be possible to alleviate those concerns without encouraging over-
consumption of health care. 
169. See supra text accompanying note 88. 
170. Gideon Yaniv et al., Junk-Food, Home Cooking, Physical Activity and Obesity: 
The Effect of the Fat Tax and the Thin Subsidy, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 823, 824 (2009). 
171. For an explanation of why traffic is the result of negative externalities, see Jona-
than Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency Versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in 
Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV. 673, 687-94 (2008). 
172. Of course, Axel used bananas. See BEVERLY HILLS COP, supra note 70. 
173. See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONGESTION PRICING: A PRIMER 2-3 (2006), 
available at http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/congestionpricing/congestionpricing 
.pdf (describing San Diego’s policy of granting free access to express lanes for vehicles with 
multiple passengers); Nash, supra note 171, at 704 n.200 (describing subsidy programs in 
Maryland and Washington, D.C.). 
174. E.g., Richard Arnott, Pricing Urban Transportation, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS: 
SELECTED PAPERS BY WILLIAM VICKREY 271, 271-75 (Richard Arnott et al. eds., 1994) (de-
scribing Vickrey’s efforts in support of congestion pricing); Nash, supra note 171, at 676. 
175. Nash, supra note 171, at 713 n.256, 727. 
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ed distributive effect by granting poorer drivers a means-tested carrot. One pos-
sibility would be a partial discount against the usual price, with the discounted 
price set at the point where the deterrent effect of the charge for average poorer 
households is comparable to the effects observed for the median household 
overall.176 
Mixing carrots with sticks isn’t a panacea, though. At a minimum, as is 
well known, offering carrots to households below an income threshold creates 
incentives to lower real or reported income below that threshold.177 That is not 
to say that we should never blend carrots with sticks, but only that when we do 
we should keep in mind we’re trading distributive fairness for revenue and in-
centives as well as cost and income effects. 
Finally, to take a smaller-scale but widespread problem, there is the rela-
tionship between bars or restaurants and their neighbors. A lively watering hole 
spills its patrons into the neighboring streets after other businesses have closed 
shop and residents have gone to bed. At evening’s end the bars’ patrons are, 
shall we say, less inhibited than in their daily lives. Here there are two solu-
tions: window bars, car alarms, and soundproofing for the neighbors, or earlier 
hours and more judicious dispensing of beverages for the entertainment venues. 
This is a case in which it is less clear that sticks dominate carrots. It may be that 
the neighbors, not the bars, are the least-cost avoiders; the most efficient way of 
mitigating the externality might be neighborly precautions, not early bar clos-
ings. But in a small community or business improvement district, each neigh-
bor might realize a fairly large fraction of the revenues from a stick, reducing 
their incentives to mitigate.178 Restaurants and bars, then, might be compen-
sated for their lost business in exchange for an agreement to close earlier. But, 
of course, that does raise the danger that the restaurateurs will have incentives 
to be even more troublesome in the hopes of securing further carrots, not to 
mention the government’s additional revenue costs. This isn’t a clear instance 
where carrots prevail, but it is at least a closer question. 
IV. ENCOURAGING POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES 
The tools I’ve described and applied so far all have their roots in a litera-
ture devoted to the study of negative externalities. But there is no obvious rea-
 
176. For other suggestions, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Re-
gimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 
1231, 1246-47 (2000). 
177. For reviews, see Jonathan Gruber, Medicaid, in MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER 
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 15, 68-72 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2003); Robert A. Mof-
fitt, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, in MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER 
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 291, 317-20. 
178. For more on business improvement districts, see Richard Briffault, A Government 
for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
365, 377-414 (1999). 
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son the carrot-and-stick framework must be limited to harmful spillovers; zero 
is just a number and the difference between positive and negative externalities 
just a sign. Scholars who study positive externalities have already applied the 
basic elements of Pigouvian taxes and other price instruments. For example, it 
is a common argument that subsidies allow producers to internalize the benefit 
others derive from their actions, as in the case of the tax subsidy for contribu-
tions to charity.179 But scholars have not yet extended the more sophisticated 
theoretical apparatus of the negative externalities literature to positive exter-
nalities. For example, I am not aware of any comprehensive consideration an-
ywhere of whether penalties for failure to produce positive externalities would 
be as effective as, or better than, a subsidy. I aim to remedy that oversight in 
this Part. 
Overall, the case for carrots is stronger when our goal is the production of 
positive externalities, but not overwhelmingly so. Once a subsidy program is in 
place, the income and output effects of the carrot reinforce its substitution ef-
fects. But expected future carrots depress current production of the externality, 
and carrots are highly wasteful compared to sticks in several other respects.  
A. General Analysis 
Income and output effects are the key difference between the negative and 
positive externality cases, and the difference is fairly straightforward. For nor-
mal goods, enriching purchasers with a carrot increases demand through both 
income and substitution effects, while sticks would undermine the intended 
substitution toward the externality-producing good. When the stick is applied to 
firms, we should expect the converse of the Baumol and Oates result: a stick 
should cause the firm to substitute toward the desired good, but at a lower level 
of output, so that theoretically the stick could actually reduce overall supply of 
the good. For instance, private foundations are subject to an annual tax if they 
fail to distribute at least five percent of their net assets,180 a provision intended 
as a prod to encourage them to fund more charitable projects. Foundations like-
ly donate more as a result,181 but those that trigger the tax also have fewer 
funds to give. If this second effect is large enough, it could swamp the positive 
benefits of the first, reducing foundations’ charitable giving on net. 
 
179. E.g., John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contri-
butions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 657, 698 (2001); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions 
Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397-98 (1988). 
180. 26 U.S.C. § 4942 (2006 & Supp. I 2007). The text above considerably simplifies 
the workings of the tax, but the details are not of interest here. 
181. For a review of the available evidence on foundation giving patterns, see Richard 
Sansing, Distribution Policies of Private Foundations, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON 
NONPROFIT ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 42, 44-51 (Bruce A. Seaman & Dennis R. Young 
eds., 2010).  
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Inferior goods are again an interesting exception to the general rule. Sticks, 
not carrots, are the best choice to exploit income effects in the production of 
inferior goods with positive externalities. A possible example here is govern-
ment spending. Some commentators have suggested that at least some public 
goods produced by the government are inferior, in that households with enough 
wealth can and often prefer to buy their own private substitute.182 The wealthy 
drive while poorer families ride the bus; rich enclaves have private security and 
need not rely on police departments.183 In the United States, the federal gov-
ernment offers its taxpayers a discount on the amount of funds they spend on 
their state and local government services.184 If it’s true that many of these ser-
vices are inferior goods—and it should be mentioned that I and a coauthor, 
among others, have found evidence to the contrary—then this subsidy may be a 
mistake.185 By enriching the taxpayers, the federal government reduces their 
demand for the inferior government-provided goods. If the goal is to encourage 
state and local government, a stick of some kind would do better, since then 
both the income and substitution effects of the stick would encourage such pur-
chases. 
As for cost-effectiveness, using carrots to encourage positive externalities 
burdens the treasury just as heavily as when they are dangled to deter negative 
externalities, and it adds some further inefficiencies as well. Wittman argues 
that carrots are preferable for the production of positive externalities because 
altruistic behavior is rare, and so the transaction costs of rewarding the few giv-
ers is lower than the costs of punishing the many nongivers.186 As we saw ear-
lier, though, transaction costs do not clearly favor carrots.187  
A more important factor is that inframarginality looms larger in the posi-
tive externality context. Recall that funds spent on carrots are wasted to the ex-
tent that some actors would have been willing to change their behavior without 
any incentive.188 In the case of positive externalities, scholars have suggested 
that people often voluntarily create public goods in return for “warm glow,” 
that is, feelings of social approbation and approval, self-worth, or satisfaction 
 
182. See BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 69 (1977). 
183. See id. at 69-70. 
184. 26 U.S.C. § 164 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).  
185. See Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Al-
ternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 226-35 
(2010); Daniel Hewitt, Demand for National Public Goods: Estimates from Surveys, 23 
ECON. INQUIRY 487, 503 (1985). 
186. Wittman, supra note 7, at 71, 79. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 90-100. 
188. Engel et al., supra note 7, at 670; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Pos-
ner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law 
and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 99 (1978) (showing that paid rescue crowds out altruistic 
rescue). 
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of their own human urge to serve mankind or create something new.189 There is 
little corresponding evidence that humans get much warm glow from announc-
ing that they have ceased harming others: proclaiming that one has just now 
stopped doing terrible deeds is something of a mixed signal.190 In the case of 
donations to charity and inventions, some have contended that society could 
obtain close to an optimal amount of charity and innovation with no govern-
ment encouragement at all,191 while no one would contend that pollution can be 
abated simply by relying on our collective good will. And payments could ac-
tually reduce warm glow by confusing the social rewards of being an             
altruist.192 
Distributive justice might favor carrots slightly, though. As I mentioned be-
fore, most existing carrots have the unfortunate effect of redistributing up-
wards, although probably no more so in the case of positive externalities. But 
the symbolic and moral valence of carrots makes more sense when we are re-
warding folks for good behavior, rather than just paying them to stop doing 
wrong by their neighbors.193 Government rewards may even help to encourage 
the development of social norms of altruism.194 That is no small thing, but I de-
scribe its benefits as minor because it is unclear whether it is unique to carrots. 
Would sticks for those who fail to be altruistic serve as well? That is unsettled 
in the psychological literature.195 Carrots could also potentially undermine al-
truistic behavior. As Sunstein argues, one possible symbolic implication of pay-
 
189. E.g., Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 
AM. ECON. REV. 1019, 1019-21 (1996); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and 
Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 701, 717 (1996). 
190. Obviously, this is a generalization. For example, there is a market in carbon off-
sets. KATHERINE HAMILTON ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & NEW CARBON FIN., 
FORGING A FRONTIER: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS 2008, at 33 (2008), 
available at http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cms_documents/2008 
_StateofVoluntaryCarbonMarket2.pdf. 
191. See, e.g., Bruce R. Kingma & Robert McClelland, Public Radio Stations Are Real-
ly, Really Not Public Goods: Charitable Contributions and Impure Altruism, 66 ANNALS 
PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 65, 66-67, 73-74 (1995) (identifying several reasons donors 
may contribute to charity, and reporting evidence that these motives are indeed important to 
observed giving). 
192. See Landes & Posner, supra note 188, at 99; see also Brian Galle, Keep Charity 
Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1224-25, 1233 (2010) (making this point about the chari-
table contribution deduction). 
193. Cf. Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147, 
1175-78 (2006) (arguing that tort law does not require compensation for gratuitous benefits 
because there is no moral duty to do so). 
194. Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 629 
(1990). 
195. Compare Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. 
SURVS. 589, 599-600 (2001) (reporting a handful of studies that find penalties crowd out al-
truistic behavior), with Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Compara-
tive Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1205-06 (2010) (finding no crowd-out from penalties). 
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ing actors to do good is that the “expected” or default state is that they have no 
such obligations.196 Psychological studies bear this intuition out to some de-
gree, finding that explicit rewards sometimes crowd out “intrinsic” motivations 
to help others.197 
But pointing back in the direction of sticks, the greater inframarginality of 
carrots to encourage positive externalities compounds the problems of anticipa-
tory and strategic crowd-out we saw earlier. As in the negative externality-
context, when actors anticipate the possibility of carrots, they have an incentive 
to delay changing their conduct in order to collect more of the carrot.198 For 
example, during the financial crisis, the Treasury Department made known that 
it was considering offering payments to banks to encourage them to lend.199 
Commentators urged the Treasury either to implement the policy immediately 
or to rule it out absolutely; knowing that subsidies might be available, firms 
would not lend at all until the subsidy was put in place, compounding the credit 
freeze.200 This delay also had a strategic lobbying component: by lending less, 
the firms deepened the crisis, likely increasing the odds that the Treasury would 
have to grant them the carrot. This same phenomenon can occur for invest-
ments to mitigate negative externalities.201 But because there is much more 
voluntary creation of positive externalities than there is reduction of negative, 
there is a proportionately greater amount of delaying and strategic behavior. 
For similar reasons, the repeated-game dynamics of sticks are more clearly 
superior to carrots in the positive externalities setting. At the risk of overgener-
alization, the regulation of negative externalities typically involves curtailing 
ongoing harmful activity, while regulation of positive externalities involves en-
couraging new beneficial activity. In the case of negative externalities, there 
was an argument that sticks might deter investment in all kinds of economic 
 
196. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 546; see also Nash, supra note 106, at 479 (arguing that 
assigning the obligation to pay to those who are responsible for producing negative exter-
nalities encourages personal responsibility and trust in government). 
197. E.g., Frey & Jegen, supra note 195, at 598-607; Mark R. Lepper et al., Undermin-
ing Children’s Intrinsic Interest with Extrinsic Reward: A Test of the “Overjustification” 
Hypothesis, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1973). There is a small but develop-
ing literature aimed at studying how to provide Pigouvian pricing without also crowding out 
intrinsic motivations. See Muradian et al., supra note 82, at 1205-07 (describing some recent 
suggestions and case studies). 
198. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 546-47 (describing incentive effects of paying 
broadcasters to produce public interest programming). 
199. Kevin G. Hall, Treasury Shifts Target of Wall Street Rescue Plan, KNIGHT RIDDER, 
Nov. 13, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 21699361. 
200. See John H. Cochrane & Luigi Zingales, Lehman and the Financial Crisis, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at A21. 
201. For example, imminent expiration of temporary tax subsidies accelerates the sub-
sidized activity. Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, Fiscal Policy and Uncertainty, 5 
INT’L FIN. 229, 231-36 (2002); Christopher L. House & Matthew D. Shapiro, Temporary In-
vestment Tax Incentives: Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation, 98 AM. ECON. 
REV. 737, 762-63 (2008).  
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activity, because of investors’ fear of unanticipated recognition of new exter-
nalities to punish.202 That is, sticks might prevent investors from beginning 
new activities for fear they will have to stop. But in the positive externality 
context, it is unclear how sticks could lead anyone to stop not doing the (unpre-
dictable) things the government will in the future want them to do.203 Even if 
investors wanted to avoid being punished for inertia, by definition they couldn’t 
know which things to start doing. So, viewed at this high level of generality, it 
looks as though sticks to encourage positive externalities typically have even 
fewer ex ante distortive effects than in the negative externality context. Of 
course, this argument has less traction if some kinds of activities are known to 
be likely to be the source of positive externalities in certain situations, such as 
manufacturing during wartime.204 
Positive externalities also do not seem to present situations in which “vic-
tim” behavior is likely to be important. Recall that in the negative externality 
context, there were some plausible situations in which carrots might better en-
courage victims to undertake efficient efforts to avoid the impact of the exter-
nality. Dari-Mattiacci argues that something similar could be true of positive 
externalities, although the only example he offers is that technology manufac-
turers could change their product to make better use of a new patent.205 While 
coordination could certainly increase the gainful impact of positive externali-
ties, it’s not obvious that it would be efficient to encourage coordinated behav-
ior. Beneficiaries may have better investments than the time and resources they 
would have to devote to searching for and cooperating with benefactors. In any 
event, Dari-Mattiacci himself argues for a more limited role for mitigation-type 
behavior for positive externalities, largely because the greater cost of carrots 
makes it more difficult to fully incentivize both sides.206 
A potential argument against sticks is that in some cases they are prohibi-
tively difficult to implement. Lazear, in his work on incentives in employment 
contracts, explains that carrots are easier to implement if the employer (or, in 
our discussion, the regulator) doesn’t have good information about the upper 
limit on how much of an output it wants.207 Take copyright law. Copyright law 
looks a lot like a carrot: it rewards those who generate positive externalities 
 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37. 
203. In more technical terms, what is happening in the positive externality context is the 
intrusion of a zero lower bound on the degree of crowd-out. Anticipated sticks might crowd 
out productive activities when those activities are already under way. But if there are no 
regulable activities in progress, there is nothing to crowd out.  
204. Cf. Levmore, supra note 132, at 1678 (noting that the government should want to 
compensate manufacturers of goods useful during crises, in order to avoid discouraging in-
vestments in producing those goods); Wittman, supra note 7, at 70 n.37 (suggesting that a 
duty to rescue might discourage people from entering areas where others may be likely to 
need rescuing).  
205. Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 21, at 33-40, 54. 
206. Id. at 38. 
207. EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONNEL ECONOMICS 65-69 (1995). 
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(authors) at the cost of the public (in the form of royalties) and some societal 
deadweight loss (from monopoly rents).208 We know we want to reward inno-
vation and creativity, but we’re not sure whether there is a point at which the 
gains from additional creations diminish.209 Although in theory we could en-
courage creativity by punishing dullards, slackers, and boring derivative 
hackery, it’s not clear how to price the punishment, or really even whom to 
punish.210 
This isn’t a particularly devastating argument in favor of carrots. Among 
other problems, the measurability argument can be turned against carrots as 
well.211 Clearly, carrots have social costs, implying that excessive production 
potentially creates as much or more social loss as inadequate production.212 If 
we don’t know the marginal gain from another unit of production, or even a 
ballpark level for the ideal amount of the good, then paying to spur more of it 
may well be worse than not paying.213 Consider the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of certain rights of copyright 
holders.214 Did this extension—which was essentially a carrot for the creation 
of protected property—increase social welfare? No one seems to know, largely 
because we don’t know the optimal amount of incentives for creativity.215 We 
could say much the same for the rule of cy pres in charitable trust law: locking 
 
208. See POSNER, supra note 48, at 52-53. 
209. See id. at 202. 
210. Cf. Wittman, supra note 7, at 71 (arguing that it may be difficult to employ sticks 
to produce positive externalities because of difficulty in identifying whom to punish).  
211. Cf. BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 7, at 214 (noting that subsidies require the gov-
ernment to specify the benchmark amount of goods to be produced); Sunstein, supra note 21, 
at 545 (noting the difficulty of designing a price instrument that captures the uncertain mar-
ginal value of another unit of public interest television); Wittman, supra note 7, at 68-69 
(pointing out that it may be difficult to find and pay all potential producers).  
212. See LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 253-54, 
271-72 (2008) (noting that even subsidies for charity should be optimized, not maximized). 
213. But see Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1533-34 
(1984) (arguing that policymakers can determine the correct level of production of a good by 
observing social consensus, even if marginal costs are not observable). A problem with 
Cooter’s argument is that community behavior may be distorted by biases and fixed in place 
by path dependence, such as the happenstance of prior law and institutional arrangements. 
Also, as he acknowledges, long-held standards simply do not exist for new policy choices, 
such as the extension of copyright in my example. 
Admittedly, even if society does not know the precise marginal social benefit of a good, 
if society knows the general slopes of the supply and demand curves for the good, then the 
regulator could make reasonable predictions about whether overproduction or underproduc-
tion is the greater danger. If we expect that the social benefit curve is relatively steep, then 
the risk of underproduction is worse, assuming equal chances of under- and overproduction. 
Reciprocally, the risk of overproduction is worse if the curve is relatively flat.  
214. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 287 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
215. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 413-
22 (2002). One thing that does seem clear is that granting the extension retroactively did not 
spur any new creations by dead artists. 
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up charitable assets to comply with the wishes of the donor has social costs, 
and it is unclear whether there are any resulting gains.216 Scholars often argue 
for repeal or reform of cy pres on this basis.217 So major uncertainty of margin-
al gains seems to cut against both carrots and sticks. 
Further, there are many instances in which it would be easy to know whom 
to punish for failure to do good for others. For example, as Calabresi showed, 
efficient penalties are imposed on the actors who can avoid harm—or, here, 
create good—at the lowest cost.218 In most instances there is a limited group of 
producers who are in a position to provide positive externalities at the lowest 
cost. Universities, for example, are probably in the best position to use educa-
tion as a tool of equal opportunity, because they have the infrastructure for 
providing education and need only add need-based financial aid to achieve the 
social-justice objective. Penalizing traditional redistributive organizations, such 
as soup kitchens, for failing also to provide education wouldn’t make sense be-
cause their cost of doing so would be orders of magnitude larger. Wittman 
seems to claim that identifiable producers are poor candidates for sticks, since 
in this situation penalties can be anticipated and so might discourage new in-
vestors from entering the regulated industry.219 But that is just another version 
of the output-effect argument. 
Overall, then, sticks do not dominate carrots as clearly in the case of posi-
tive externalities as they did in the case of negative externalities. Income effects 
tend to favor carrots, and distributive justice arguably does as well. On the oth-
er hand, the repeated-game story may more clearly argue for sticks here than it 
did in the negative externality setting. Which factors are most important likely 
will vary between different kinds of goods.  
B. More Examples 
As with price mechanisms for negative externalities, my analysis of price 
mechanisms for positive externalities raises hard questions for many current 
government subsidy programs. U.S. firms get a number of different tax breaks 
to encourage them to invest in research and development, in purchases of new 
capital equipment, and in the sale of equipment manufactured in the United 
States.220 Other subsidies reward firms for such diverse activities as operating 
 
216. See Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1123 & 
n.38 (1993). 
217. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 48, at 697; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead 
Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 353, 379-91 (1999). 
218. See CALABRESI, supra note 136, at 150-52; see also Saul Levmore, Explaining 
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 73 (1985) (extending least-cost avoider analysis to those who 
provide benefits to others). 
219. See Wittman, supra note 7, at 71. 
220. 26 U.S.C. §§ 167-199 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
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airports in rural areas or building affordable housing.221 In all these cases, the 
carrots do arguably encourage positive externalities, but at the cost of revenue 
dollars, many of which are likely to be inframarginal, and strategic behavior on 
the part of the firms. 
What differs in the positive externality case, again, is that output effects 
make carrots more plausible. Shifting to sticks could lower the overall output of 
the firm. For instance, if we charged a higher tax on firms that fail to invest in 
capital equipment, firms would shift toward capital investment, but each firm 
would shrink, so that the net effect could be lower capital investment overall. 
On the other hand, if we have correctly estimated the value to society of the 
firm’s externalities, the substitution toward capital would make the whole 
economy more efficient. The more vibrant customer base should in turn offset 
some of the reduction in output from the stick. 
In any event, my argument is not that all existing carrots for positive exter-
nalities are obviously misguided, only that they are undertheorized and under-
studied. At present, no one is asking whether the net output effect of using car-
rots is worth the investment of revenues we’re devoting to these programs. 
More empirical research into that question is needed before we can say with 
confidence whether we’ve made the right choices. 
Similar questions confront proponents of other new carrots, such as David 
Schizer’s recent outline of the arguments in favor of making news providers 
eligible for the charitable contribution deduction.222 The deduction operates as 
a matching grant for donors, and so is effectively a carrot to encourage them to 
“purchase,” through their donations, the charity of their choice.223 Schizer 
compellingly lays out the social benefits of quality news organizations, and ex-
plains why these benefits are positive externalities the modern market fails to 
deliver.224 
Schizer doesn’t consider, though, whether the carrot of the charitable con-
tribution deduction would be preferable to a stick alternative. As Sunstein has 
argued, in theory we could impose a tax or other damages assessment against 
news organizations that merely serve up tabloid gossip and information-free 
political horse-race coverage.225 Alternately, we could revert to a regulatory 
regime, such as the old FCC requirement that organizations demonstrate that 
 
221. Office of Aviation Analysis, Essential Air Service Program, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., 
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/x-50%20role_files/essentialairservice.htm (last visited Apr. 
13, 2012); HOME and Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & 
URB. DEV., http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/training/web/lihtc (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2012). 
222. See David M. Schizer, Subsidizing the Press, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2011). 
223. See Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Contributions, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY 224, 228-32 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). 
224. Schizer, supra note 222, at 5-16. 
225. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 539-42. 
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they broadcast “in the public interest.” Such regimes in effect impose the costs 
of real newsgathering on the news firm.226 Again, it is possible that by reducing 
the profitability of news as a business field, these sticks would drive away some 
organizations, somewhat reducing the amount of news overall.227 But the ques-
tion is whether avoiding that danger is worth the other costs of converting to 
carrots instead. 
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCENTIVE DESIGN 
So far I have argued that in most situations sticks are a better policy tool 
than carrots. Still, as my many examples have shown, carrots are common-
place—and more are, shall we say, sprouting up all the time.228 In this Part, I 
explain the overgrowth of carrots, argue that carrots should be unacceptable 
even for very important projects, and consider some potential tools for trim-
ming them back. 
A.  The Tragedy of the Carrots 
Carrots have a number of contributing causes, some relatively obvious and 
some less so. Now that I have made clear the distributive and revenue differ-
ences between carrots and sticks, the basic political economy of carrots is 
straightforward. Public choice theory predicts that the political interests of a 
small concentrated group will usually win out over those of the general pub-
lic.229 Producers of a given externality are typically a small, discrete group, at 
least relative to the population as a whole. Redistribution to producers drains 
the treasury or increases the deadweight loss of taxation, but these are costs 
borne by the whole population.230 Though producers, too, bear some of the 
cost, their individual gains are much bigger, so that consumption of the shared 
 
226. See id. at 544. 
227. Cf. STERNER, supra note 7, at 171 (noting that subsidies affect output by attracting 
new investment in the regulated field). 
228. See, e.g., Frans L. Leeuw, The Carrot: Subsidies as a Tool of Government—
Theory and Practice, in CARROTS, STICKS, AND SERMONS: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR 
EVALUATION 77, 77 (Marie-Louise Bemelmans-Videc et al. eds., 2007) (reporting that major 
European countries spend between twenty and thirty-five percent of their GDP on grants and 
subsidies); cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1117 (noting that a rule under which 
victims compensate polluters for limiting their right to pollute “may well be the most fre-
quent device employed”). 
229. For overviews, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT (1962); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). 
230. See Chulho Jung et al., The Coase Theorem in a Rent-Seeking Society, 15 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 259, 261 (1995) (noting that dispersed interests are less likely to be able to 
defend an efficient choice of policy instrument that favors them); Merrill, supra note 97, at 
287-89 (arguing that public choice theory explains successful political opposition to a carbon 
tax).  
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treasury dollars is a classic tragedy of the commons.231 Furthermore, loss aver-
sion makes those who might be subject to sticks lobby with particular vigor 
against them. And recipients of existing carrots become richer, and so have 
more resources to attract entrepreneurs who will help them defend their carrots, 
entrenching government mistakes.232 
A particularly ironic implication of the public choice analysis is that carrots 
will be underproduced in exactly the situations when they might be defensible. 
Recall that carrots might make sense in the case where mitigating behavior by 
victims of negative externalities is important, and where the group of such vic-
tims and carrot-payers is small and cohesive.233 But a small, cohesive group of 
victims is likely to have the political power to resist paying for carrots, and 
push for sticks instead. Carrots might also be justifiable when the externality 
producer is especially poor, but poor producers may lack the political resources 
to win the carrot’s passage.234 
To be sure, these are overgeneralizations. Concentrated interests sometimes 
lose out to a highly activated populace or very motivated policy entrepre-
neurs.235 My claim is not that we always get carrots, only that the political sys-
tem inefficiently overproduces carrots when they are undesirable and yet may 
also underproduce them in the unusual cases when they’re sensible. 
Less obviously, some aspects of U.S. law may compound social overpro-
duction of carrots. For one thing, the basic structure of our federalist system of 
government encourages carrots. It is a familiar point that, because of inter-
jurisdictional competition, subnational governments cannot easily redistribute 
 
231. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 
279, 292-93 (1992) (arguing that requiring compensation for takings increases takings be-
cause the costs of compensation are not paid for by direct beneficiaries but instead come 
from the federal treasury); Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instru-
ments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 347-48 (1998) (explaining 
that firms may oppose efficient regulations when redistribution from the firm exceeds the 
firm’s share of social welfare gains). But see DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 77-78 
(2000) (suggesting that narrow interest groups may be disadvantaged in some regulatory set-
tings). For a description of the commons problem, see Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest 
Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 913-25 (2004). 
232. See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 41-73 
(2010).  
233. See supra text accompanying notes 145-56. 
234. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy, and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1277, 1327-28 (1993). If the group of beneficiaries is relatively easy to organize, how-
ever, an initial lack of resources may be unimportant. Entrepreneurs might be willing to or-
ganize and advocate for the beneficiaries in exchange for their political support, or for a por-
tion of the other expected proceeds of their victory. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing 
Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 501, 518-19 (1998).  
235. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment—
Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 49-56 
(1998). 
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away from mobile businesses or citizens.236 As I’ve explained, sticks amount to 
redistribution from the externality producer to the general public. It follows 
that, if states want to regulate relatively mobile producers, they will face heavy 
pressure to use carrots. If the welfare losses from choosing carrots over sticks 
are large enough, my analysis here amounts to a new reason to keep some poli-
cies at the national level. Similarly, since exit pressures are especially acute at 
the local level,237 the carrot/stick choice may be a reason to retain policy at the 
state level rather than devolving it to local governments. Where victim mitiga-
tion is important, though, local use of carrots might actually be efficient, since 
local government may come close to embodying the situation in which the 
group of victims and carrot-payers is small and can easily coordinate. 
Judge-made federalism doctrine compounds the basic structural preference 
for carrots. For example, in order to win their competition with their neighbors, 
state and local governments routinely give away hundreds of millions of dollars 
in tax breaks and other incentives to retain large employers (professional sports 
teams, most famously).238 Under my carrot/stick analysis, the better policy 
would be simply to impose fines on those who leave.239 Yet the Supreme Court 
has clearly condemned state efforts to punish departures, while implicitly bless-
ing the grant of tax incentives to stay.240 From the perspective of federalism 
theory, it isn’t obvious we should permit either one, as free competition can al-
so have some healthy effects.241 But if the Supreme Court is going to allow 
states to tilt the market for interstate capital in their own favor, it might be 
 
236. The basic problem is that if the state persists in redistribution efforts, those who 
are burdened in excess of their local benefits will leave, threatening local prosperity and lo-
cal officials’ electoral prospects.  
237. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 39-71 (2001). 
238. See Charles C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates, Assistance to the Poor in a Federal 
System, 32 J. PUB. ECON. 307, 328 (1987); William F. Fox & John A. Swain, The Federal 
Role in State Taxation: A Normative Approach, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 611, 614-15 (2007). 
239. This tactic is not unheard of. For example, the Charlotte Bobcats reportedly signed 
a contract with the City of Charlotte agreeing to pay a $200 million termination fee if they 
break the lease on their arena and move to another city. A Look at Potential NBA Relocation 
Candidates, SEATTLE TIMES (July 13, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
html/nba/2008048569_sonichart13.html.  
240. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284 (1987) (holding that 
states cannot “plac[e] a financial barrier” at their borders). On the Court’s willingness to 
abide incentives for entry, see New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) 
(dictum); and Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1959) (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court’s equal protection decisions could be reconciled on 
the grounds that states can reward newcomers but not punish them). But see Cuno v. Daim-
lerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 742-48 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that selective state tax bene-
fit for in-state manufacturer violated the dormant Commerce Clause), rev’d on other 
grounds, 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
241. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Con-
straints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 382-405, 440-48 
(1996) (arguing against state-level relocation incentives). 
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worth considering whether it should at least allow states to use the most effi-
cient tool for doing so.  
At the federal level, judge-made rules defining when private plaintiffs have 
standing or a “right of action” to sue to enforce federal law also affect the 
choice between carrots and sticks.242 When a political coalition presses the 
government for a solution to its problems, one factor it must consider is wheth-
er it will be able to ensure that the government continues to uphold its agree-
ments in the future.243 Obviously, if the coalition is at all far-sighted, it will 
prefer that its goals actually continue to be met over time.244 And, recognizing 
this, legislators and other policy entrepreneurs will demand larger rents for du-
rable legislation, giving both sides of the bargaining table an incentive to prefer 
such structures.245  
In their archetypical forms, carrots offer greater long-term assurances to 
the pro-regulation coalition than do sticks.246 Private litigants generally lack 
standing to force the government to act to impose a penalty, and modern courts’ 
narrow construction of statutes authorizing private suits usually prevents third 
parties from suing under federal law to compel government action, even when 
that action would benefit them directly.247 Beneficiaries of government lar-
gesse, on the other hand, usually have a due process right to challenge any in-
dividualized denial or curtailment of their benefits.248 While this due process 
right does not typically extend to interested third parties, coalitions can expect 
that carrot recipients will want to protect their carrot entitlement, and they can 
fund lawsuits to help the recipients do so. Thus, current law encourages coali-
 
242. For overviews of the doctrines, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 101-39 (6th ed. 2009). 
243. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 62-63 (2000). 
244. See id.; see also Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 571-
72, 581 (1996). 
245. See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and 
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 946 (1987). 
246. I say “in their archetypical forms” here because my framework also defines a stick 
as any painful departure from the status quo. So a stick may simply be a reduction in a 
preexisting carrot program, in which case the sharp ease-of-monitoring distinction between 
the two instruments fades.  
247. For a cogent summary of the law on suits to force government action, see Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1664-74 (2004). On the questionable status of private suits by third-
party beneficiaries, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts 
Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 385-93 (2008); and Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private 
Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113, 125-37 
(2010). 
248. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don’t Add Up to Rights: The Importance of 
Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 
1111, 1121-26, 1137-39 (1996) (explaining the right to challenge an individualized denial 
and summarizing case law distinguishing that right from the opportunity to challenge general 
government policy shifts). 
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tions to prefer carrots if they want greater guarantees that a regulatory tool will 
be enforceable by the public if the regulator fails to use it with sufficient vigor. 
Yet another doctrine that favors carrots over sticks at both the state and 
federal levels is the law of unconstitutional conditions. The Supreme Court has 
said that governments are generally under no obligation to provide subsidies to 
activities that they disfavor.249 As a result, it has held that Congress can per-
missibly refuse to fund pornography in libraries,250 lobbying by charities,251 or 
medical advice on whether a patient should get an abortion.252 Congress can-
not, though, impose a “penalty” on these kinds of expressive activities.253 The 
constitutionality of the government’s action depends almost entirely on whether 
a program can be characterized as a penalty or a subsidy.254 Again, there may 
be some wisdom in this distinction, but we should also recognize that it con-
tributes to government preferences for carrots over sticks. 
A final potential body of law feeding the carrot frenzy is congressional 
budgeting rules. A number of commentators suggest that Congress’s method of 
calculating the cost of tax expenditures lowers the political salience of those 
expenditures, making them easier to enact than a more direct spending program 
would be.255 As my examples have illustrated, many modern carrots take the 
form of tax expenditures. Could the solution to the carrot problem be as simple 
as merely better disclosing and emphasizing to the public the true cost of      
carrots? 
I am skeptical that the solution is quite so easy. Increased transparency is 
effectively a subsidy to facilitate citizen lobbying. Even if citizens respond to 
this subsidy, though, their work might be offset by the reaction of better-
informed, “sophisticated” citizens who were already lobbying before the in-
creased carrot disclosure.256 Prior to the increased disclosure, the sophisticate 
assumed that her fellow citizens would not lobby. That left her unable to free 
ride on others’ efforts, so she herself lobbied.257 As she observes increased 
transparency, however, she will expect that the average voter will become more 
attentive, allowing her to reduce her own effort as long as the new lobbyists 
 
249. E.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
250. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.) 
(plurality opinion). 
251. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. 
252. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). 
253. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896-97 (2010). 
254. See Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal 
Revenue Code’s Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1282-1314 
(1993). 
255. E.g., Mary L. Heen, Congress, Public Values, and the Financing of Public Choice, 
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 898-910 (2004); Kleinbard, supra note 9, at 18-20. 
256. See Galle & Klick, supra note 185, at 237-38. 
257. See id. 
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share her own interests.258 Greater disclosure can thus lower total lobbying 
overall, depending on whether this crowd-out effect is greater than the increase 
in lobbying among those who weren’t lobbying before.259 
B.  Carrots for Key Programs? 
Having said all this about our political hunger for carrots, is it possible that 
carrot-demand is no tragedy at all, but instead a useful tool? Environmental 
economists argue that political opposition to sticks is a reason to favor carrots 
as policy tools.260 Similarly, in teaching my course on the law and economics 
of the public sector, I often encounter an argument from students that runs 
something like this: “The carbon tax is dead. Cap and trade isn’t happening. 
Why not try giving people subsidies to reduce global warming?” In effect, they 
ask: if a regulatory goal is important enough, and its political prospects are suf-
ficiently tenuous, isn’t it worthwhile to pay the extra social cost of the carrot to 
buy a better chance of passage? 
Perhaps, but consider the effect of that decision on the incentives of other 
externality producers. Recall that when carrots are on the table, private actors 
have incentives to increase their production of negative externalities and cut 
their production of positive ones, and either way to exaggerate the cost of 
achieving the government’s goal.261 By shifting toward inefficient behavior, 
and selectively disclosing the information they hold, producers can increase the 
size of the government carrot they will collect.262 
Now suppose, as my students might propose, that the amount of inefficien-
cy the government observes determines not only the amount of the carrot, but 
also the probability of receiving a carrot rather than a stick. That, after all, is 
the implication of the idea that when social costs are high enough, it becomes 
worthwhile to pay more for a carrot. What happens if producers can observe 
that the bigger the problem looks, and the more difficult passing a solution ap-
pears, the more likely a carrot? Because exaggeration now increases both the 
size of reward and also the likelihood of receiving it, producers’ incentives to 
 
258. Of course, in many cases sophisticates may be at odds with the interests of the 
general public. See, e.g., Keohane et al., supra note 231, at 359 (claiming that hidden costs 
facilitate enactment of environmental regulations that disfavor the general public). In that 
situation, transparency would presumably increase lobbying by both the public and also the 
sophisticates who must attempt to outweigh them.  
259. For additional skepticism that tax-expenditure opacity can be cured simply by dis-
closure, and the comment that many other forms of government transfers are just as hidden, 
see Roin, supra note 31, at 624.  
260. E.g., STERNER, supra note 7, at 196; Engel et al., supra note 7, at 669; Mestelman, 
supra note 7, at 187; see also Levmore, supra note 132, at 1665-66 (suggesting that a com-
mitment against occasional payoffs to “losers” of new regulatory policy would reduce the 
amount of good new policy overall). 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 122-30, 141, and 198-201. 
262. Id. 
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inflate the problem, either through bad behavior or selective reporting, increase 
astronomically. 
In fact, the best policy is likely the opposite of “carrots for big problems”: 
the government should commit credibly to using carrots only for small, unim-
portant problems. Or, equivalently, it can promise that the more serious an ex-
isting social problem, the more likely it will use a stick. If producers believe 
this promise, then they will have stronger incentives to voluntarily reduce the 
losses from their activities (or omissions) in advance of regulation, since that is 
their only path to a carrot. This political incentive may partially or even wholly 
offset their incentive to exaggerate in order to increase the size of the carrot. Of 
course, if successful, this policy would also encourage producers of negative 
externalities to conceal any private information they hold. But as I mentioned 
before, there are ways to design around this informational problem, such as by 
offering a bounty to whistleblowers. 
A possible compromise approach for “big problems” would be to try to 
reframe sticks as carrots. If policymakers can successfully shift externality pro-
ducers’ subjective baseline, they would diminish loss aversion among the pro-
ducers, and thereby somewhat ease the passage of their controversial new poli-
cy.263 Something of this sort seems to be behind political efforts to prop up a 
cap-and-trade regime by emphasizing to polluters the potential gains for those 
who would get free permits or could cut costs very efficiently,264 and also be-
hind efforts of opponents to frame cap and trade as a new tax.265 Reframing is a 
compromise position because if it’s successful, it diminishes the cost-
effectiveness of the policy once it’s put into place, as enforcers will then have 
lost the additional deterrent effects that loss aversion creates.266 Reframing thus 
allows policymakers to sacrifice some efficiency in order to edge high-stakes 
controversial rules closer to passage, but without presenting the dangerous in-
centive effects of switching wholly to carrots. 
 
263. Cf. Robert W. Hahn, Jobs and Environmental Quality: Some Implications for In-
strument Choice, 20 POL’Y SCI. 289, 299 (1987) (reporting that voters respond to the per-
ceived, rather than actual, impact of costs and benefits); Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry 
Sullivan, Constituency Influences on Legislative Policy Choice, 18 QUALITY & QUANTITY 
299, 301-02 (1984) (same). 
264. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
300, 330 (1995) (describing grandfathering of permits as a tool for winning political support 
from polluters); Stavins, supra note 8, at 351 (describing the political advantage of cap and 
trade as avoiding a “focus” on higher costs). 
265. See, e.g., George F. Will, Editorial, Carbon’s Power Brokers, WASH. POST, June 1, 
2008, at B7. For evidence on the importance of framing on public perception of energy tax-
es, see Shi-Ling Hsu et al., Pollution Tax Heuristics: An Empirical Study of Willingness to 
Pay Higher Gasoline Taxes, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3612, 3617-18 (2008). 
266. I am grateful to Darien Shanske for this point.  
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C. Committing to the Carrot-Free Diet 
 As I’ve emphasized repeatedly, my analysis implies a fairly urgent need 
for governments to be able to commit themselves not to give away carrots. 
There is now a small but growing literature on the problem of government self-
commitments, driven mostly by the dangers of moral hazard in government in-
surance programs.267 Since moral hazard arises when the insured’s conduct im-
poses negative externalities on the insurer,268 we can see this moral hazard lit-
erature as a subset of the more general class of problems I have analyzed. 
Writers in that literature emphasize the difficulty that democratic governments 
have in pledging not to bail out insureds who have made bad decisions—in my 
parlance, governments can’t credibly promise sticks rather than carrots.269 
Among other reasons, giving out carrots is politically rewarding in the present, 
while sticks are better choices for the long run—when the politicians are all re-
tired.270 Although the many pitfalls of government commitment are too com-
plex for a serious treatment here, let me highlight three of the most promising 
options. 
The time-tested solution is delegation to a relatively less political body.271 
Anyone who has attended an American law school since the middle of the past 
century can recite off-hand the strengths and weaknesses of that route, since it 
is in effect the path of constitutional entrenchment with enforcement by a long-
tenured judiciary.272 There are variations on the model, as with the delegation 
of monetary policy to the Federal Reserve, an independent agency.273 Probably 
the most persistent critique of both variants is the room they leave for slack be-
 
267. See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public 
Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 968-72 (1992); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: 
The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 672-97 (2011); 
Adam Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. (forth-
coming 2012) (manuscript at 19-23); Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure 
Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 
1375-90 (2011). 
268. Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. 
ECON. 251 (1973). 
269. E.g., Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 267, at 1370. 
270. See Galle & Klick, supra note 185, at 200-02 (explaining causes of present bias 
among state and local policymakers). 
271. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 267, at 661-62, 672-81; Terry M. Moe, The Politics 
of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATION THEORY: 
FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 116, 137 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 
1990); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A 
Comment on Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111, 114 (1992). 
272. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an In-
terest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). 
273. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The 
Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 613-14 (2010). 
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tween current popular preferences and the value choices of the politically re-
mote officials.274 
With sixty-plus years of unending debate having so far failed to resolve the 
political-insulation question, it is worth mentioning two other avenues. Both 
basically involve contracting with third parties, although in different ways. One 
option is to contract out the task of regulation to other politically accountable 
bodies, but subject to rules that those other bodies cannot easily influence. So, 
for example, the federal government can assign the task of setting environmen-
tal policy to states or to federal agencies, and expressly prohibit those other 
decisionmakers from using carrots except in certain limited circumstances. Of 
course, it will always be possible for lobbyists to go directly to Congress for 
relief from the carrot limits, or for direct preemption of the stick enacted by the 
delegated regulator. But the delay and cost of these additional steps, and the 
loss of other benefits of the chosen institutional form, combined with the possi-
bility that the delegated regulator will fight to retain its authority, will at least 
diminish the expected likelihood and cost-effectiveness of carrots.275 So, for 
example, Kirk Stark and I have proposed a system of federal-state agreements 
to enable states to commit to saving when their short-term political preferences 
are for spending and borrowing.276 
Another contracting direction is for the government to hire others, not to 
make the decisions for it, but instead simply to enforce its promises. Here the 
cutting-edge work is by Michael Abramowicz and Ian Ayres, who suggest that 
governments can promise contractually to pay outsiders if they fail to keep their 
promises—in essence, selling “commitment bonds.”277 The advantage of this 
approach over constitutionalism or delegation to the Federal Reserve (as well 
as its vulnerability) is that political actors retain ultimate decisional authority; if 
they think breaking a promise is important enough to the public to be worth the 
price, they can.278 It is, in essence, a meta-stick: a stick for sticks. 
CONCLUSION 
Price instruments are often presented as the best choice for coping with the 
problem of externalities, but as I’ve shown, they face serious issues of their 
 
274. E.g., POSNER, supra note 48, at 868-69, 871. 
275. Cf. Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1381, 1414 (2007) (ex-
plaining entrenchment of appointed personnel as deriving from the value that the appointer 
assigns to the delegate’s connections within and knowledge of their institution); Levinson, 
supra note 267, at 694-97 (suggesting that political institutions achieve insulation from poli-
tics in part because they are structured to favor certain outcomes).  
276. Brian Galle & Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing State 
Budget Crises, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 619-41 (2012). 
277. Michael Abramowicz & Ian Ayres, Commitment Bonds, 100 GEO. L.J. 605, 622-44 
(2012).  
278. Id. at 33. 
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own. Sticks are typically the better of the two price tools—albeit not as clearly 
superior as prior literature suggests—while law and politics push us strongly 
toward carrots. That dilemma reverberates across many areas of law. For      
example, the most basic problem with tax expenditures is not, as critics until 
now have complained, that they are part of the tax code, but rather that they are 
expenditures. 
Though I believe these points are important ones, they obviously are only a 
small piece of what there is to be said about carrots and sticks. With a problem 
of this size, it is one thing to point it out, and another thing to solve it. I don’t 
claim to have easy answers. As I’ve implied, there are a number of legal rules 
that could be reformed to ease somewhat the demand for carrots. Efforts to cor-
rect externalities could be funded more extensively by the federal government, 
which faces less pressure to avoid redistribution. And we could strive to re-
frame policies so that they seem to be gains for everyone instead of losses for 
externality producers. All of these routes themselves offer trade-offs and obsta-
cles. Similarly, the flaws of price instruments might make other regulatory 
choices, such as command and control, quantity regulation, or just sharing in-
formation, more appealing.279 But similar questions of redistribution and incen-
tives likely also arise there, although I leave that work for another time. 
Another aspect of carrots and sticks, and one which might offer some solu-
tions to the dilemma they present, is that the two can be combined to solve any 
given social problem. I’ve already mentioned briefly two such combinations: 
carrots can be offered to a select portion of the population, to overcome distrib-
utive problems or reluctance to disclose information, while the rest of the popu-
lation faces a stick. With the basic framework I’ve drawn in place, it should be-
come easier to identify and evaluate opportunities for useful combinations.280 
Lastly, my analysis here has largely assumed that externality producers re-
spond to incentives. But there are a number of ways in which that assumption 
could be questioned. Individuals might be relatively inattentive to or unaware 
of some forms of policy instrument. Furthermore, firms are controlled by hu-
mans, who may have motivations differing from the firm’s economic inter-
ests.281 Likewise, my analysis here is likely different when the target of one 
government’s efforts is another government: in addition to the possibility of 
 
279. For an example of a skilled combined analysis of several of these factors together, 
see Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 494-503 
(2009). On the use of information as a regulatory tool, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Infor-
mation as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a 
New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 286-345 (2001); Evert Vedung & Frans C.J. van der 
Doelen, The Sermon: Information Programs in the Public Policy Process—Choice, Effects, 
and Evaluation, in CARROTS, STICKS, AND SERMONS: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR 
EVALUATION, supra note 228, at 103. 
280. For some prior discussions of carrot/stick combinations, see Engel et al., supra 
note 7, at 669; Smith, supra note 65, at 695-96. 
281. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302-11 (1983). 
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agency costs,282 there is also the question of whether such factors as income 
and output effects can be translated coherently to a government producer. But 
that must wait for future work. 
 
282. Levinson, supra note 136, at 356-57. 
